REGULATING SPORTS GAMING DATA
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I. INTRODUCTION

“Congress can regulate sports gambling directly, but if it elects not to do so,
each State is free to act on its own,” concluded the U.S. Supreme Court in Gov.
Murphy v. NCAA.1 In the two years since the Supreme Court declared the partial
federal sports betting ban in the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act
(“PASPA”)2 unconstitutional and, in turn, opened up the legalization of sports
betting nationwide, there has been one topic that has garnered considerable
attention—sports gaming data.
‘Data’—a generic word that includes news and information about sports
gaming—has become one of the most-discussed contemporary topics in sports
gaming regulation globally.3 Indeed, since the Supreme Court case, the
regulatory treatment of sports betting news, information, and data has taken a
prominent role in dozens of legislative bodies, at numerous industry conferences,
and in a prominent lawsuit recently filed in the United Kingdom. Industry
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1
Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1484–85 (2018). As
of June 20, 2020, there remains a spin-off legal proceeding in the court system that
is unrelated to the foci here. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J.,
939 F.3d 597 (3d Cir. 2019); see also Tony Batt, U.S. Supreme Court Bats Down
Hail Mary Pass by Sports Leagues, GAMBLING COMPLIANCE (May 19, 2020). In
addition, a considerable number of court documents from the precursors to the
Supreme Court case remain sealed or partially redacted. See Ryan M. Rodenberg,
Sealed Files, First Amendment Right of Access, and the Supreme Court Sports
Betting Case, 124 PENN ST. L. REV. PENN STATIM 336 (2019).
2
28 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3704 (2018).
3
For purposes of this paper, the words “data,” “information,” and “news” are treated
as synonyms and used interchangeably. Likewise, the words “gaming,” “gambling,”
“wagering,” and “betting” are used interchangeably herein.
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attorney Andrew Nixon wrote: “Anyone close to the commercial side of sports
content is likely to know that certain leagues, competitions or event organisers
see the data generated during the course of their events as an important part of
their commercial portfolios, and understandably so: data, and in particular live
data, collected from a sports event has become a valuable commodity from a
media perspective, and from a betting perspective.”4
There are at least three reasons why data play a critical role in the sports
gaming industry: “First, data are used to determine the outcome of wagers,
including real-time bets that are made and graded almost instantaneously.
Second, data are analyzed for statistical fingerprints indicative of possible
integrity issues about the underlying sporting event and the tethered gambling
markets. Third, the extent to which sports betting data are available raises a host
of complex legal matters.”5
In the United States, federal and state efforts to legislate in the area of sports
gaming data create various statutory and constitutional issues. Likewise,
competition law and property rights (if any) in Europe, Australia, and beyond
could be implicated if lawmakers or industry players move to commercially
consolidate data access and sales in the sports gaming space. This paper will
analyze whether regulatory scrutiny could attach to efforts bent on monetizing
or restricting the news and information used in sports gaming.
This paper also explores potential regulatory action in the context of sports
gaming data and proceeds in four parts. Part II provides a primer on the sports
gaming data market. Part III highlights regulatory issues specific to the United
States. Part IV pinpoints regulatory issues globally. Part V concludes with a brief
summary discussion and outlook.
II. THE SPORTS GAMING DATA MARKET
A. Overview
The post-PASPA market for sports betting data took shape during the
pendency of the litigation that eventually landed at the Supreme Court.6 In early
2016, it was reported that “U.S. sports leagues are rapidly cutting deals with
companies involved in sports betting. To varying degrees, the leagues are
4

Andrew Nixon, Data Collection from Sports Events: A Nonexclusive Future?,
LAWINSPORT (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.lawinsport.com/topics/item/datacollection-from-sports-events-a-nonexclusive-future.
5
Privacy, Big Data, and Competition: Hearings on Competition and Consumer
Prot. in the 21st Century Before the Fed. Trade Comm’n, 6th Sess. (2019) (statement
of Ryan M. Rodenberg, Assoc. Professor, Fla. State Univ.).
6
For a historical account of sports gaming data, see James H. Frey & I. Nelson Rose,
The Role of Sports Information Services in the World of Sports Betting, 11 ARENA
REV. 44 (1987).
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partnering—openly and in secret—with oddsmakers, betting prognosticator, and
data providers that make sports wagering possible in the digital age.”7 Indeed,
the entire litigation between five prominent U.S.-based sports leagues8and New
Jersey can be seen as a vehicle for shaping how news and information are
commercialized for sports gaming:
[The] lawsuit…is not about gambling. It is about control: control of
events, control of data, control of marketing opportunities, and control
of current and future revenue streams. This is a clash between sports
leagues looking to reserve opportunities to monetize sporting events as
commodities and cash-strapped states intent to raise tax revenue via
regulation of an industry with a massive volume of underground
activity.9
The root of the friction between the sports leagues and New Jersey
over revenue generation rests on the yet-to-be-definitively decided
issue of whether a sporting event itself can be owned and, if so, by
whom.10 Indeed, in unrelated litigation, Fox Broadcasting Company, a
broadcast partner of the MLB and NFL, posited that the dissemination
of information related to sporting events is one in the public interest
and analogous to a ‘parade, a natural disaster, a March on Washington,
or a government shutdown.’11
Such position runs counter to one where sporting events are treated as
a commercially exploitable commodity. Intriguingly, this position has
been espoused by the major media partners of all five Christie II
7

Steve Fainaru, et al., Betting on the Come: Leagues Strike Deals with GamblingRelated
Firms,
ESPN
(Jan.
27,
2016),
https://www.espn.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/14660326/nba-nfl-mlb-nhl-strikingvarious-business-deals-gambling-related-firms. Some sports leagues, such as the
NFL, are now preparing to allow league teams to become sports betting operators
themselves. David Purdum, New CBA Allows
Owners, Players to Cash in on Stadium Sportsbooks,
ESPN (March 20, 2020), https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/28930507/newcba-allows-owners-players-cash-stadium-sportsbooks.
8
The NCAA, NFL, NBA, NHL and MLB were all co-plaintiffs in the Supreme
Court case.
9
Anastasios Kaburakis, et al., Inevitable: Sports Gambling, State Regulation, and
the Pursuit of Revenue, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 27, 27-28 (2015).
10
Id. at 36.
11
Id. at 36, n.58 (citing Brief of Amici Curiae Fox Broadcasting Company and Big
Ten Network, LLC in Support of Defendant NCAA’s Motion for Summary
Judgment at 18, In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig.,
No. 09-CV-01967 CW (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2012).
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plaintiff sports leagues; ABC, CBS, Fox, and NBC have acknowledged
that ‘sports broadcasts concern matters of public interest.’12
Nevertheless, in the wake of the 2018 Supreme Court decision, various sports
leagues have embarked on a five-pronged federal-state lobbying effort to
monetize sports betting. Pushing for a so-called ‘official data requirement’ has
consistently been one of the proffered arguments. The five-pronged lobbying
points are set forth in Figure 1 below.13
Figure 1

12

Id. (citing Brief of A&E Television Networks, LLC, in Support of Appellant
NCAA and Reversal at 6, Edward C. O’Bannon, Jr. v. NCAA, Nos. 14-16601, 17068 (9th Cir. 2014).
13
Among the five pecuniary-related lobbying requests made by various sports
leagues, the request for a so-called ‘integrity/royalty fee’ has garnered considerable
media attention. As of June 20, 2020, no state has passed a law requiring that a sports
league be paid any ‘integrity/royalty fee.’ Nevertheless, several sports leagues such
as the NBA, MLB, and PGA Tour continue to publicly request that new legislation
include such a mandatory fee. Two leagues—the NBA and MLB—also
commissioned a ‘study’ related to the request. See Spectrum Gaming Sports Group,
Sports-Betting Royalty Fee Study (March 8, 2019) (on file with author).
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In general, sports leagues attempt to monetize sports gaming data in two
ways. First, sports leagues may seek to sell such data themselves. Second, sports
leagues may partner with a third-party data broker on an exclusive14 or nonexclusive15 basis, with the partner paying the league for the ‘right’ to disseminate
data. The latter route has been the most popular to date, with sports league
employees and designees describing data they sell as ‘official.’ One MLB
employee predicted that sports gaming operators who opt against using ‘official’
data “won’t be around for long.”16 Widespread reporting has detailed the datarelated sales practices of sports leagues and their partners.17
Issues pertaining to sports betting news, information, and data have been
frequently discussed in state and federal legislative activity since the Supreme
Court’s ruling. For example, on March 3, 2020, NFL team executive Rich
McKay of the Atlanta Falcons reportedly told a Georgia Senate Committee that

14

For example, the NFL has partnered with a firm named Sportradar on an exclusive
basis. See Jill R. Dorson, NFL Gives Sportradar Exclusive Rights to League Data,
SPORTS HANDLE (Aug. 13, 2019), https://sportshandle.com/nfl-gives-sportradarexclusive-rights-to-league-data/; Dustin Gouker, The NFL’s Big
Betting Deal with Sportradar: Questions and Answers, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Aug.
12, 2019), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/35135/nfl-betting-deal-withsportradar-questions-and-answers/; Eben Novy-Williams, NFL Takes First Major
Gambling Step with Sportradar Data Deal, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 12, 2019),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-08-12/nfl-takes-first-majorgambling-step-with-sportradar-data-deal.
15
Robert H. Mann, Understanding the NBA’s Sports
Betting Data Deals with Sportradar, Genius Sports, SPORTS HANDLE (Dec. 5, 2018),
https://sportshandle.com/nba-sports-betting-sportradar-genius-sports-federal/.
16
Brad Allen, MLB: Operators Not Using Official Data “Won’t Last Long,” EGR
GLOBAL (July 2, 2019), https://egr.global/intel/news/mlb-operators-not-usingofficial-data-wont-last-long/.
17
See Matt Rybaltowski, Shakedown Fees: NBA, MLB Demanding
Nevada Sportsbooks Pay More or Get Cut Off, SPORTS HANDLE (May 2, 2019),
https://sportshandle.com/nba-mlb-demands-data-fee-nv-sportsbooks/; John Holden,
Integrity Fee Issues For NBA and MLB Run Deeper Than They Appear, LEGAL
SPORTS REP. (May 10, 2019), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/32378/holden-nbamlb-integrity-fee/; Eben Novy-Williams, As the Playoffs Heat Up,
the NBA Looks to Profit from Gambling, BLOOMBERG (May 10, 2019),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-10/as-the-playoffs-heat-up-thenba-looks-to-profit-from-gambling; Regina Garcia Cano, NBA, MLB Using Data to
Chase Better Deals with Sportsbooks, ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 8, 2019),
https://apnews.com/fe1cb6a75efe4f77be41ec6ff8664069.

14

UNLV GAMING LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 11:1

certain data providers are “under surveillance” during games.18 According to
media reports, McKay said: “We’re in a position now in our stadium where we
have people walking around the stadium [on] game day, looking for people that
are pushing out results, and pushing out data because people are betting on that,
and that’s something that is very uncomfortable for us, and not something we
were ever doing two years ago that we’re doing now.”19 Gaming has even made
its way into the collective bargaining agreements between sports leagues and
unionized players. A draft version of the NFL-NFLPA collective bargaining
agreement dated March 5, 2020 accounted for revenue derived from “operation
of gambling of any kind in an NFL stadium” and “revenues related to ensuring
the gambling-related integrity of NFL games.”20
One motivation for the emphasis on regulating sports gaming data is to
ensure the accuracy of betting outcomes for both consumers and operators,
thereby preserving the integrity of the underlying betting market.21 When news,
information, and data are manipulated, betting fraud can result. The elimination
of betting fraud is a shared priority of regulators, customers, operators, and sports
leagues, with leagues cognizant that fan engagement can be explained, at least in
part, via wagering.22 The focus on betting fraud has been widespread. In May
18

Tony Batt & Matt Carey, Atlanta Falcons CEO Says Unofficial Sports Data
Providers are Under Surveillance, GAMBLING COMPLIANCE (March 4, 2020),
https://gamblingcompliance.com/premium-content/insights_analysis/atlantafalcons-ceo-says-unofficial-sports-data-providers-are.
19
Id.
20
NFL-NFLPA Collective Bargaining Agreement, 70-72 (March 5, 2020),
https://nflpaweb.blob.core.windows.net/media/Default/NFLPA/CBA2020/NFLNFLPA_CBA_March_5_2020.pdf. The same document calculated gambling
revenue from wagers as “the aggregate net difference between gaming wins and
losses (not the total amount wagered) net of all excise taxes or other gambling or
gaming-related taxes or surcharges actually paid or owed.”
21
In a revealing—and ironic—twist, having a single data provider (or a small
number of data providers) has the potential to create greater integrity risks given the
susceptibility to manipulation/failure that cannot be rebutted by a robust market with
multiple providers to correct any errors. Ryan Rodenberg & Jack Kerr, Fake News,
Manipulated Data, and the Future of Betting Fraud, ESPN (June 27, 2017),
https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/19752031/future-sports-betting-fake-newsmanipulated-data-future-betting-fraud.
22
For academic discussions of this issue, see Nick Burkhart & Dylan Welsh, The
Legalization of Sports Gambling: An Irreparable Harm or the Beginning of
Unprecedented Growth?, 21 SPORTS L.J. 145 (2014); Brad R. Humphreys, et al.,
Consumption Benefits and Gambling: Evidence from the NCAA Basketball Betting
Market, 39 J. ECON. PSYCH. 376 (2013); Christine Hurt, Regulating Public Morals
and Private Markets: Online Securities Trading, Internet Gambling, and the
Speculation Paradox, 86 B. U. L. REV. 371 (2006); Steven Salaga & Scott Tainsky,
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2017, U.S. Congressman Frank Pallone (D-NJ) introduced federal sports betting
legislation that required “[a]ppropriate safeguards to ensure, to a reasonable
degree of certainty, that a bet or wager is fair and honest, and to prevent, to a
reasonable degree of certainty, cheating (including collusion and the use of a
cheating device).”23 More narrowly, a spotlight has been put on the transmitter
of news, information, and data from a sporting event:
Betting fraudsters have discovered a far simpler target: the data scout.
Data scouts are those who log play-by-play information on location, in
real time. They watch the entire game, manually updating the action as
it progresses. They are the filter through which all details must pass,
and without them, the global betting industry—especially in-play
betting—would grind to a halt. In the lower tiers of sport, data scouts
might be a game’s only link to the outside world, and that makes them
potentially more valuable than a crooked referee or bent goalkeeper.
After all, why go to the trouble of fixing a match when you can simply
pay the data scout to delay logging the result long enough to make a
strategic bet? All it takes is 30 seconds…The problem of data delays is
particularly embarrassing for tennis. The chair umpires might
themselves be the data scouts, feeding numbers into a touchscreen
tablet and, from there, to the gambling world. Recently, tennis umpires
from three different countries were banned after involvement in such a
scam…But delayed data are only the start. Fake data from nonexistent
sporting events occur, too. Once fraudsters realized they could control
the flow of information between the field and the database, it was only
a matter of time before fictional matches started to appear. Those are
called ‘ghost games.’ How do they work? A data scout in some farflung corner of the world enters a fake game into the system, perhaps
with the help of an industry insider, and then logs the phantom match,
play-by-play, in any direction the fraudsters require. If no vetting

Betting Lines and College Football Television Ratings, 132 ECON. LETTERS 112
(2015). Contrary to prior statements—including some made under oath in court
proceedings—about injury and irreparable harm from sports gaming, multiple sports
leagues have now attested that “[s]ports betting gives fans another exciting way to
engage with the sports they love [and] a legal and regulated sports betting
market…would be beneficial to sports and their fans…” Joint Statement from the
Commissioners of the National Basketball Association, National Hockey League,
Major League Baseball, Major League Soccer, and Canadian Football League (June
8, 2020), available at http://canadiangaming.ca/wp-content/uploads/Leagues-JointStatement.pdf.
23
Rodenberg, supra note 21.
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occurs, the ghost game can be picked up by gambling operators who
fail to double-check the game’s authenticity.24
A useful comparison can be made between sports gaming data and stock
market data. Scholar Jerry Markham recently chronicled the latter’s history,
revealing some parallels to the nascent market for sports betting data, news, and
information, especially that of the real-time variety.25 According to Markham,
during the early days of the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) there was a
‘curb market’ that existed on the street due to “the NYSE’s exclusive access to
members only.”26 Markham continued:
During the Civil War, NYSE did relent somewhat on nonmember
access to its market data. Nonmembers were allowed to listen to
trading on NYSE ‘through a keyhole for [a fee of] $100.’ After the
war, spectators were also allowed to watch trading from the gallery of
the new NYSE floor…for a fee of only $50. This set a precedent for
selectively providing access to exchange market data for a fee.27
Decades later, Markham detailed how “the NYSE created the New York

24
Id. See also Ryan Rodenberg, How Gambling ‘Courtsiders’ are Affecting Tennis,
ESPN (Aug. 21, 2015), https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/13481104/howcourtsiders-affecting-gambling-integrity-tennis-chalk (courtsiders are people who
attend tennis tournaments “for the purpose of transmitting data in real time to
employers who are often continents away”). An executive at a sports gaming data
dissemination firm recently described the vast number of data scouts his company
employs: “Our focus is on procuring the most reliable, high quality data, and we do
[so] by employing over 7,000 data scouts worldwide, covering over 20,000 live
events each month.” See Sport Industry Group, David Lampitt Q&A—Sportradar:
Data Data Data (July 3, 2019), https://www.sportindustry.biz/features/davidlampitt-qa-%E2%80%93-sportradar-data-data-data. See also Press Release, Tennis
Integrity Unit, Venezuelan Match Official Armando Alfonso Belardi Gonzalez
Suspended and Fined for Corruption Offenses, TENNIS INTEGRITY UNIT
(June 19, 2020), https://www.tennisintegrityunit.com/media-releases/venezuelanmatch-official-armando-alfonso-belardi-gonzalez-suspended-and-fined-corruptionoffences (“…Mr Gonzalez had…failed to report two approaches he received in 2018
soliciting him to become involved in a corrupt scheme to manipulate match
scores…”).
25
See generally Jerry W. Markham, Regulating the Sale of Stock Exchange Market
Data to High-Frequency Traders, 71 FLA. L. REV. 1209 (2019).
26
Id. at 1216–17 (“In 1837, the NYSE discovered that some nonmember traders had
drilled a hole through a brick wall at the NYSE building that allowed them to
overhear surreptitiously NYSE trading activity.”).
27
Id. at 1217 (internal citations omitted).
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Quotation Company to handle the distribution of its trading data.”28 Likewise,
the stock ticker “further facilitated the development of the market for exchange
data.”29 Issues pertaining to ownership of trading prices spread to the
commodities market too. According to Markham:
[T]he Board of Trade of the City of Chicago (“CBOT”) and other
commodity exchanges generated valuable market data for traders. This
data became a highly marketable commodity, and the CBOT
contracted with the Western Union telegraph company to provide data
from its trading floor to subscribers throughout the country. The
CBOT used its control over this trading data to fend off competitive
threats from ‘bucket shop’ operators.30
Litigation ensued after a variety of companies in the industry “claimed that
exchange market data was a matter of public interest and not exchange
property.”31 In 1905, the Supreme Court addressed the issue in Chicago Board
of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co.,32 finding that “the plaintiff’s collection
of quotations is entitled to the protection of the law. It stands like a trade secret.
The plaintiff has the right to keep the work which it has done, or paid for doing,
to itself.”33 Markham concluded that the Supreme Court’s ruling “set a strong
precedent for the proprietary treatment of such information as a commodity that
could be selectively sold to preferred market participants.”34 Markham also
detailed the latency advantages derived from being in close proximity to the
trading floor:
Exchange trading data was also available on an even more privileged
basis to traders operating on the floors of the stock exchanges. Those
exchange members were given a time and place advantage over other
traders. This is because stock quotations and last-sale reports were
disclosed on the floor in advance of their transmission to other traders
by telegraph or publication in newspapers. That time and place
advantage meant that floor traders trading for their own accounts could
respond to current, real-time market data before off-exchange traders
28

Id.
Id.
30
Id. at 1218 (internal citations omitted).
31
Id. (citing J. Harold Mulherin, et al., Prices are Property: The Organization of
Financial Exchanges from a Transaction Cost Perspective, 34 J.L. & ECON., 591
(1991)).
32
Chicago Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236, 250-51
(1905).
33
Id. at 250.
34
Jerry W. Markham, Regulating the Sale of Stock Exchange Market Data to HighFrequency Traders, 71 FLA. L. REV. 1209, 1218 (2019).
29
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received that information. This provided a tremendous trading
advantage to the floor traders. The cost of that access was the
requirement that the floor traders purchase an often very expensive
membership on the exchange and pay membership fees.35
The applicability of the data-specific analogy between stock exchanges and
sports is illustrated when looking at prior statements made by various leagues.
During the lead-up to the Supreme Court case, the NCAA, NHL, NBA, MLB,
and NFL claimed to have a proprietary interest in “the degree to which others
derive economic benefits from their own games.”36 The same five leagues also
posited that they “have an essential interest in how their games are perceived and
the degree to which their sporting events become betting events.”37 In a different
court filing, the same leagues referenced “legally protected interests of the
organizations that produce the underlying games.”38
Years earlier, the NFL, NHL, and MLB argued that they “share a common
interest with the NBA in protecting and preserving for professional sports
leagues and their member clubs, the rights to, and commercial value of, exclusive
presentation of real-time running accounts of the live professional sporting event
that result from their efforts and investments.”39 The position was also furthered
via Congressional testimony when PASPA was being considered by the Senate.
According to then-NBA executive David Stern: “Conducting a sports lottery or
permitting sports gambling involves the use of professional sports leagues’
games, scores, statistics and team logos, in order to take advantage of a particular
league’s popularity; such use violates, misappropriates and infringes upon
numerous league property rights.”40
More recently, an MLB employee testified during a government proceeding
in Washington State that the “statutory and regulatory structure must recognize
that sports betting is derivative of the games—i.e. without sports there is no

35

Id. at 1219 (internal citations omitted).
Response Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees at 18, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v.
Christie, 926 F. Supp. 2d 551, Nos. 13 13-1713, 13-1714, 13-1715 (D.N.J. 2013).
37
Id. at 13-14.
38
Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
the Complaint at 1, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, 926 F. Supp. 2d 551
(D.N.J. 2013).
39
Brief for The National Football League, The Office of the Commissioner of
Baseball and the National Hockey League as Amici Curiae Supporting the National
Basketball Association and NBA Properties, Inc. at 9, Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v.
Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d. Cir. 1996) (No. 96-7975).
40
Prohibiting State-Sanctioned Sports Gambling: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On
Patents, Copyrights & Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. at
51 (testimony of David J. Stern) (1991).
36
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sports betting.”41 Similarly, the same MLB employee warned a Colorado
government entity about ‘pirated’ data collected in alleged violation of ticketing
terms or scraped from a website.42 A ‘coalition’ of sports leagues, including
MLB, NBA, and PGA Tour, also told the Washington State Gambling
Commission about why they should be entitled to a ‘royalty:’43

In Ohio, the NFL, Cleveland Browns, and Cincinnati Bengals sent a letter to
lawmakers asking them to consider, among other things, “[p]rotection of our
content and intellectual property, including from those who attempt to steal or
misuse it.”44 The Cincinnati Reds, in an unsigned submission to Ohio lawmakers,
also alluded to disfavored data collection methods:45

41

Brad Allen, MLB: Betting is a ‘Derivative’ of Sport and Leagues Should be
Compensated as Such, EGR GLOBAL (Oct. 18, 2019), https://egr.global/intel/news/
mlb-betting-is-a-derivative-of-sport-and-leaguesshould-be-compensated-as-such/.
42
Matt Rybaltowski, Colorado Stakeholders Offer Diverging Views on Data
Licensing at Integrity Working Group, SPORTS HANDLE (Dec. 11, 2019),
https://sportshandle.com/colorado-stakeholders-integrity-working-group/ (at the
same hearing, other testimony alluded to a “some concern that the leagues and its
partners will ‘circuitously’ create a monopolistic situation”).
43
Sports League Coalition Presentation to Washington State Gambling Commission
at 21 (Oct. 10, 2019) (on file with author).
44
Letter from Bob Bedinghaus, et al. to Representative Scott Oelslager and
Representative Jack Cera at 1 (Oct. 8, 2019).
45
Cincinnati Reds Written Submission (Oct. 9, 2019).
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A PGA Tour representative submitted testimony in Ohio and pinpointed
“web scrapers and on-site operatives:”46

In Illinois, a lobbyist for the NBA, PGA Tour, and MLB submitted proposed
rulemaking that addressed both courtsiding and web scraping under the umbrella
of an ‘official league data’ requirement:47

46

Testimony of Andy Levinson, PGA Tour, [Ohio] House Finance Comm., Hearing
on HB 194 (Oct. 9, 2019).
47
Letter from Jeremy Kudon to Chairman Charles Schmadeke, Illinois Gaming Bd.
(Sept. 27, 2019).
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Given these positions, it was forecasted—in 2016 Congressional
testimony—that “it is plausible to infer that certain sports leagues may: (i) seek
to memorialize certain gaming-related intellectual property rights through
litigation or legislation; (ii) move to license so-called “official data rights” to
third party gaming operators; and/or (iii) create gaming platforms themselves to
offer (exclusive) wagering options directly to consumers and, in turn, cut out
competitors.”48 The forecast stemmed from the conclusion that “[p]roprietary
and non-proprietary real-time data are the fuel for burgeoning live wagering and
in-game fantasy sports.”49 Such forecast is not novel. Almost forty years earlier,
the NFL had made similar claims against Delaware when the state looked to offer
a football-themed lottery game. In ruling against the NFL, the federal judge
wrote extensively about the NFL’s claim that the state was seeking to reap what
it had not sown:
It is undoubtedly true that defendants seek to profit from the popularity
of NFL football. The question, however, is whether this constitutes
wrongful misappropriation. I think not. We live in an age of economic
and social interdependence. The NFL undoubtedly would not be in the
position it is today if college football and the fan interest that it
generated had not preceded the NFL’s organization. To that degree it
has benefited from the labor of others. The same, of course, can be said
for the mass media networks which the labor of others have developed.
What the Delaware Lottery has done is to offer a service to that portion
of plaintiffs’ following who wish to bet on NFL games. It is true that
Delaware is thus making profits it would not make but for the
existence of the NFL, but I find this difficult to distinguish from the
multitude of charter bus companies who generate profit from servicing
those of plaintiffs’ fans who want to go to the stadium or, indeed, the
sidewalk popcorn salesman who services the crowd as it surges
towards the gate. While courts have recognized that one has a right to
48

Daily Fantasy Sports: Issues and Perspectives: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
114th Cong. 42 (2016) (statement of Ryan M. Rodenberg). In accord, see Ryan
Rodenberg, Wagering on the Future, ESPN THE MAGAZINE (Feb. 03, 2015),
https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/12251828/gambling-issue-charles-barkleyfive-voices-debating-sports-gambling-legalization (“Leagues will posit that types of
data are proprietary (think sabermetrics meets sports gambling) and will seek
licensing fees from sportsbooks and fantasy operators. The leagues will also look to
offer wagering options to consumers. Finally, like fantasy’s emphasis on player
outcomes, sports betting will continue to shift sporting events from competition
between teams and players to a commercialized spectacle. Gambling and fantasy
drive consumer interest.”).
49
Daily Fantasy Sports: Issues and Perspectives: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
114th Cong. 42 n.48 (2016) (statement of Ryan M. Rodenberg).
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one's own harvest, this proposition has not been construed to preclude
others from profiting from demands for collateral services generated
by the success of one’s business venture. General Motors’ cars, for
example, enjoy significant popularity and seat cover manufacturers
profit from that popularity by making covers to fit General Motors'
seats. The same relationship exists between hot dog producers and the
bakers of hot dog rolls. But in neither instance, I believe, could it be
successfully contended that an actionable misappropriation occurs.50
Researcher Christian Frodl divided up sports gaming data into three
categories: (i) fixtures; (ii) event data and performance data; and (iii) raw data
and refined data.51 Fixtures is a catch-all category that includes items such as the
competition schedule, player line-ups, and game rules.52 The second category—
event data and performance data—captures the individual events taking place
within the competition as well as tethered information such as fan attendance and
weather.53 Included here is high-tech data invisible to the naked eye and only
derived from digital cameras, body sensors, or microchips placed in game
equipment.54 The final category includes box-score type of news as well as
aggregate information compiled after (or during) the event, such as “overall
passes in a soccer match or…unforced errors in a tennis match.”55
The structure of the sports gaming data market can be described as follows:
The market for sports betting information is best explained through a
linguistic flowchart with several forks in the road. The first fork in the
road bifurcates sports betting data according to time, with two prongs:
(i) historical and (ii) real-time/in-game. The market for historical
sports betting information is largely decentralized and easy to access,
with market participants finding requisite information about alreadycompleted game scores or archived player-level performance statistics
from a variety of widely available sources, including television, radio,
internet, or via phone from on-site spectators. In contrast, the market
for real-time/in-game sports betting news is contentious and involves
certain market participants taking measures to centralize distribution

50

Nat’l Football League v. Governor of Del., 435 F. Supp. 1372, 1378 (D. Del.
1977).
51
Christian Frodl, Commercialisation of Sports Data: Rights of Event Owners Over
Information and Statistics Generated about Their Sports Events, 26 MARQ. SPORTS
L. REV. 55, 57 (2015).
52
Id.
53
Id. at 58.
54
Id. at 59.
55
Id.
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channels via on-site access restrictions, demand letters, litigation, and
legislative lobbying.
The second fork in the road branches out from the real-time/in-game
path, with one prong for proprietary data and the other prong for nonproprietary data.56 Proprietary data in the sports betting realm includes
information generated from high-tech sources such as digital tracking
cameras, microchips in balls, and biometric devices worn by athletes.
Such proprietary information is effectively invisible to the naked eye
and remains in the private domain until released—immediately or
otherwise—by the licensor or owner. Tech-generated proprietary data
currently plays very little role in the sports betting data market. The
other fork at this stage involves non-proprietary live data such as upto-the-second game scores or as-it-happens player performances with
only minimal latency. Sports leagues such as the [NBA] and [MLB]
have been lobbying in favor of statutory ‘data mandates’ that attach to
such real-time/in-game information used for betting.
The third road fork extends from the non-proprietary real-time/in-game
data prong. The first attaches to so-called ‘unofficial data’ that are
collected on-site by individuals or by other means (e.g. computer
scripts or drones) operating without the explicit approval of the sports
league involved in the underlying contest or game. Collectors of such
‘unofficial data’ count sports betting operators as customers in their
distribution chain. The second attaches to so-called ‘official data’ that
are collected on-site or by other means by a sports league itself or by
one or more individuals who operate with a sports league’s approval.
Collectors of such ‘official data’ also count sports betting operators as
customers in their distribution chain.
The fourth and final fork in the road spawns from the ‘official data’
path… The first prong extends to an individual sports league with inhouse capabilities to vacuum up sports betting-relevant information
and sell it directly to sports book operators. The second prong is
occupied by data dissemination firms operating with the respective
league’s stamp of approval. Such data dissemination firms—operating
as an intermediary, broker, or agent—then turn around and sell the
information collected to sports betting operators and others. States like
Tennessee[, Michigan,] and Illinois with statutory ‘data mandates’
56
For an overview of whether sports betting information, news, and data can be
owned, see Ryan M. Rodenberg et al., Real-Time Sports Data and the First
Amendment, 11 WASH. J. L. TECH. & ARTS 63, 101 (2015). Although beyond the
scope of this paper, an analysis of a market where the underlying product (news,
information, and data) may be neither owned nor controlled would lend itself to a
peculiar, and perhaps paradoxical, antitrust review. Likewise, if a sports league
suddenly started claiming ownership of such data after decades of silence and nonenforcement, the possibility of the laches defense presents itself too.
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attach along this fourth prong, purportedly requiring sports betting
operators to purchase information from either a sports league or a
league designee.57

The structure of the market can also be visually represented in Figure 2 on the
next page:

57

Ryan M. Rodenberg, Antitrust Standing After Apple v. Pepper: Application to the
Sports Betting Data Market, 64(4) ANTITRUST BULLETIN 584, 588–589 (2019).
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The sport of tennis provides a useful case study on the structure of the sports
gaming market too. According to a recent commissioned study:
[T]he ATP, WTA, and ITF have entered into contracts to sell live
scoring for almost all their events. The ATP and WTA agreed to sell
their live scoring data to Enetpulse in 2011, and the ITF agreed to sell
its live scoring data to Sportradar in 2012. While generating millions
of dollars in revenue annually, those contracts have permitted betting
operators to offer a far broader range of bets on a far greater number of
tennis matches, especially at the [l]owest [l]evel of ITF events. Before
this (sic) data became available, betting operators could not offer inplay markets unless: [(i)] they purchased unofficial data from a data
supply company that had entered into a data sales agreement with an
individual tournament or otherwise; [(ii)] they sent their own scouts to
an event; [(iii)] a match was available on a live broadcast; or [(iv)]
scores were capable of being instantly ‘scraped’ from the internet.58
The interplay between and among different classifications of data is an issue
that crosses continents. In Europe, for example, there is a ‘database right’ that
may attach to certain compilations of data. However, a commentator has opined
that “[t]he database right applies whether the data is collected under the auspices
of an official league data deal or via open source means. It has led to a situation
whereby all three major suppliers in the space—Sportradar, StatsPerform, and
Genius Group—now provide both types of data to their clients.”59 A BetGenius
executive described the broad scope of its company offerings as follows: “The
BetGenius solution delivers live sports data feeds, price management support for
pre-game and in-play odds across all major U.S. and international sports, as well
as a bespoke, end-to-end price and risk management advisory service.”60 The
peculiar way in which data are labeled—and the impact on integrity-related
concerns—were addressed by a Sportradar executive in 2019:
We’re transparent about the fact that there is a place for both official
and open-source data in the market. This has long been the case and
58

ADAM LEWIS, ET AL., INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF INTEGRITY IN TENNIS: FINAL
REPORT 20 (2018) (on file with author).
59
Scott Longley, European Blueprint Provides Official
League Data Guidance for US Sports Betting, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Sept. 23, 2019),
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/35557/official-league-data-europe-us-sportsbetting.
60
Tom Washington, BetGenius Provides Resorts World Catskills’ Sportsbook with
Trusted Pricing, Data, and Risk Solutions, GENIUS SPORTS (Sept. 3, 2019),
http://news.geniussports.com/betgenius-provides-resorts-world-catskills-withtrusted-solutions.
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every major data supply company provides a mix of official and opensource data. Having said that, the majority of Sportradar’s data is
official and we invest in official relationships with sports where there
is genuine value that can be unlocked and protected. For sports bodies,
having an official supply of data can enhance integrity as, importantly,
it enables a contractual link between the sport, the data supplier and
the betting operator which can help with setting requirements around
information-sharing for integrity purposes, for example. However,
there is also an integrity benefit to having multiple sources of data.
This is simply because having a single source of truth leads to at least
two problems: firstly it means there is a single point of failure which
can potentially create significant financial risk in the betting market;
secondly it can lead to “information monopolies” which stifle
competition and innovation in the data business, ultimately leading to
consumer harm (through increased cost or lack of choice). This means
that generally speaking we advocate for non-exclusive data
partnerships, particularly outside the very top tier of sports
competition, as well as for the fact that open-source data collection has
a valid part to play in a healthy market.61
B. Collecting and Disseminating Sports Gaming Data
Latency-related advances in technology have allowed for the
commodification of real-time data, opening up new possibilities in sports
gaming. Indeed, such advances “have allowed spectators, professional sports
gamblers, journalists, and business-minded innovators to attend sporting events
and disseminate real-time information through several mediums.”62 Sports
leagues—sometimes working in concert with exclusive or near-exclusive data
brokers—have similarly moved to monetize the distribution of real-time sports
data “while simultaneously trying to limit others’ ability to do so.”63
The practice of quickly transmitting news and information about sporting
61

See Sport Industry Group, David Lampitt Q&A—Sportradar: Data Data Data
(July
3,
2019),
https://www.sportindustry.biz/features/david-lampitt-qa-–sportradar-data-data-data#pfPJ40iqZipt8D5v.99.
62
Ryan M. Rodenberg, et al., Real-Time Sports Data and the First Amendment, 11
WASH. J. L. TECH. & ARTS 63, 65 (2015).
63
Id. Although outside the scope of this paper, an ancillary issue pertaining to data
collection methods takes place in the anti-match-fixing integrity monitoring
industry—namely, companies in this space use crawler software to scrape odds from
hundreds of bookmakers worldwide and it is uncertain whether such companies pay
each bookmaker for such data and/or receive pre-approval to do so. See Tom Ward,
Inside the Endless Fight to Kill the $1 Trillion Match-Fixing Industry, WIRED UK
(July 9, 2019), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/football-betting-match-fixing-oddssportradar.
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events for betting purposes is often called ‘courtsiding,’ a word likely derived
from the activity in tennis, a sport that has been at the forefront of speedy gaming
data for years.64 For example, tennis governing bodies, such as the ATP Tour
and WTA Tour, are among several leagues that embargo public domain data for
multiple seconds as a way to protect lucrative gambling-specific distribution
deals.65 Courtsiding is valuable to gamblers because communication from inside
the stadium is faster (and sometimes more accurate) than a delayed television,
radio, or internet broadcast. Sports leagues have described courtsiding by nonapproved third parties as a threat to integrity or an illegal activity. Such leagues
have tried to curb the practice in a variety of ways, including surveillance, notices
to spectators, ticket purchase agreements, and credentials for members of the
media. Sports league employees testifying before state governmental bodies have
also followed scripted speaking points about ‘pirated’ data.66
Existing federal law could also curb sports gaming transmissions by sports
leagues, third party gamblers, or otherwise. The Wire Act potentially attaches to
anyone “engaged in the business of betting or wagering.”67 While most precedent
64

For an overview of what courtsiding entails, see Craig Dickson, ‘Courtsiding’ in
Sport: Cheating, Sharp Practice, or Merely Irritating?, LAWINSPORT (March 13,
2015), https://www.lawinsport.com/topics/item/courtsiding-in-sport-cheatingsharp-practice-or-merely-irritating. High-speed betting in tennis has been covered
extensively. See generally BRAD HUTCHINS, GAME, SET, CASH! INSIDE THE SECRET
WORLD OF INTERNATIONAL TENNIS TRADING (2014); see also Carl Bialik, Inside the
Shadowy World of High-Speed Tennis Betting, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (May 29, 2014),
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/inside-the-shadowy-world-of-high
-speed-tennis-betting. Greg Bishop &
John Martin, Tennis’s New Concern; Data Harvesting, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/22/sports/tennis/tenniss-new-concern-dataharvesting.html.
65
Danielle Rossingh, Gamblers May Lose Edge as Tennis Tours Sell Live Scores,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 28, 2011), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-0928/tennis-tours-sell-live-scores-to-curb-illegal-data-collection-raise-funds.
66
John Holden, Ahoy! Leagues Say There Be
Pirates Stealing Sports Betting Data!, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Nov. 29, 2019),
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/36087/mlb-pga-tour-sports-betting-data. For a
recent example from California, see Letter from NBA, et al., to Hon. Bill Dodd (June
1, 2020), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/
CA-League-letter.pdf (“The only dependable way to offer in-game bets is to use
official data that is produced by sports leagues in real time. The alternative—using
pirated and other unofficial data sources for these bets—creates a high risk of
inconsistent betting results and resulting damage to consumer confidence.”).
67
18 U.S.C. § 1084(a). The relevant portion of the Wire Act reads as follows:
Whoever being engaged in the business of betting or wagering knowingly
uses a wire communication facility for the transmission in interstate or
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suggests that the Wire Act’s reach extends only to bookmakers,68 the scope of
the statute has been litigated and studied for decades.69 A recent in-depth study
found the Wire Act to have boundaries:
[The phrase] “the business of betting or wagering” is not a broad,
limitless phrase applicable to all businesses whose commercial
activities relate to gambling in some way or manner. Rather, the phrase
is very precise language directed at businesses that themselves bet or
wager with others and thereby risk or stake money in a game or contest
that the business may win or lose depending upon an eventuality.70
Such a conclusion is consistent with the Wire Act’s safe harbor for
“transmission[s] in interstate or foreign commerce of information for use in news
reporting of sporting events,”71 but could be scrutinized if the sporting event
itself was formed to create gaming content and funded/organized by an entity
also in the business of disseminating data, setting betting lines, and monitoring
gaming integrity-related issues.72
With transmission speed of news and information relevant to sports gaming
at a premium,73 one approach that that was recently permitted by a federal

foreign commerce of bets or wagers or information assisting in the placing
of bets or wagers on any sporting event or contest, or for the transmission
of a wire communication which entitles the recipient to receive money or
credit as a result of bets or wagers, or for information assisting in the placing
of bets or wagers, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not
more than two years, or both.
68
See United States v. Baborian, 528 F. Supp 324 (D. R.I. 1981); see also United
States v. Southard, 700 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1983).
69
See James H. Frey & I. Nelson Rose, The Role of Sports Information Services in
the World of Sports Betting, 11 ARENA REV. 44, 48, 49 (1987).
70
Ben J. Hayes & Matthew J. Conigliaro, The Business of Betting or Wagering:’ A
Unifying View of Federal Gaming Law, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 445, 446 (2009). For
additional discussion, see Brief for the United States in Opposition, Cohen v. United
States, 536 U.S. 922 (2002) (No. 01-1234 ) (on file with author) and United States v.
Cohen, 260 F.3d 68 (2d. Cir. 2001). See also John T. Holden, Through the Wire Act,
96 WASH. L. REV. 677, 718 (2020).
71
18 U.S.C. § 1084(b).
72
See generally SportBusiness Staff, Genius’ New ‘Grand Slam’ Tennis Series
Creates Content for Betting Markets, SPORTBUSINESS
(May 26, 2020), https://www.sportbusiness.com/news/genius-sports-joins-forceswith-topnotch-management-for-new-tennis-series/.
73
See Marcus Townend, Racing Out to Ban Drones over Fears They ‘Give Punters
MAIL
(Jan.
16,
2019),
Unfair
Edge,’
DAILY
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regulator involved artificial ‘speed bumps’ to inhibit the advantages of those with
ultra-fast data access.74 The context for the speed bump approach was a U.S.based futures market involving an exchange that desired to add a multimillisecond barrier to “reduce the latency advantages between traders engaged
in arbitrage strategies against related markets.”75 The applicant explained
further:76

The Commodities Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) permitted the
speed bump implementation.77
Beyond in-person data collection via courtsiding, sports betting news and
information can also be obtained via scraping a website with near-real-time
feeds. A U.S. federal law called the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”)
bans unauthorized access to a computer.78 Resulting case law has focused on
when access is ‘authorized’ or not, with diverging results.79 Scholar Orin Kerr
has posited that “authorization to access a computer is contingent on trespass
norms.”80 The Ninth Circuit recently decided a CFAA case that is—as of June

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/sport/racing/article-6595747/Drones-flown-Britishtracks-stream-live-races-punters-unfair-edge.html; see also Ryan Rodenberg,
How Gambling ‘Courtsiders’ Are Affecting Tennis, ESPN (Aug. 21, 2015),
https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/13481104/how-courtsiders-affectinggambling-integrity-tennis-chalk.
74
Alexander Osipovich, Path Cleared for Futures ‘Speed Bump,’ WALL ST. J. (May
15, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/first-speed-bump-coming-to-u-s-futuresmarkets-11557924822.
75
Letter from Jason V. Fusco, Asst. Gen. Coun., Market Regulation, ICE Futures
U.S., Inc. to Christopher J. Kirkpatrick, Sec. of Comm’n, Office of the Secretariat,
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n at 1 (Feb. 1, 2019) (on file with author).
76
Id.
77
CFTC’s Division of Market Oversight Issues Statement on the Certification of
ICE Futures U.S., Inc. Submission No. 19-119 (May 15, 2019) (on file with author).
78
18 U.S.C. § 1030.
79
On April 20, 2020, the Supreme Court granted cert in Van Buren v. United States,
206 L. Ed. 2d 822 (Apr. 20, 2020) and could address the circuit split that has
developed about the scope of the CFAA.
80
See Orin S. Kerr, Norms of Computer Trespass, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1143 (2016);
see also Josh Goldfoot & Aditya Bamzai, A Trespass Framework for the Crime of
Hacking, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1477 (2016). The CFAA has also been analyzed
under a void-for-vagueness lens. See Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1561, 1575 (2010).
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20, 2020—at the certiorari stage at the Supreme Court.81 For purposes of a
preliminary injunction motion, the Ninth Circuit held that the CFAA does not
necessarily criminalize web scrapers who access publicly-available data for
commercial reasons, even if the website owner has stated that it does not approve
of such access.82 The Ninth Circuit observed that “[t]he data hiQ seeks to access
is not owned by LinkedIn.”83 While casting doubt on the prospects of CFAA
liability, the Ninth Circuit did point out that other claims could be available, such
as trespass to chattels, copyright infringement, misappropriation, unjust
enrichment, conversion, break of contract, or breach of privacy.84
The Ninth Circuit’s recent ruling is likely welcome news to sports gaming
data brokers and operators unwilling (or unable) to pay for access to news and
information already in the public domain. The ruling came down at about the
same time that sports league lobbyists and employees were testifying before state
governments on related topics. In Michigan, lobbying activity resulted in the
insertion of language that would prohibit a sports gaming operator from
obtaining data originating from “live event attendees in violation of terms of
admittance” or “automated computer programs that compile data from the
internet in violation of terms of service.”85 An MLB employee and Seattle
Mariners employee specifically mentioned “online scraping” (and “courtsiding”)
in a joint presentation to the Washington State Gambling Commission excerpted
below:86

81

hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 938 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2019). In seeking a
declaratory judgment, hiQ did not further a laches argument, a potentially relevant
issue in the sports gaming data context.
82
Id. at 993. Notably, the Ninth Circuit viewed the CFAA as an anti-hacking statute,
not a misappropriation law.
83
Id. at 1003.
84
Id. at 1004 (citing Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F. Supp.
2d 537, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)).
85
Matthew Kredell, Michigan Lawmaker Ready to
Take a Swing at Sports Betting Bill, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (May 17, 2019),
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/32607/michigan-sports-betting-bill-2019/.
86
Quest Meeks & Fred Rivera, Sports League Coalition Presentation to Washington
State Gambling Commission at 17 (2019) (on file with author).
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Attention focused on how sports gaming data are collected and disseminated
will continue regardless of whether additional states enact so-called ‘official
data’ statutes. In states where such mandates are enacted, it remains to be seen
if: (i) regulatory scrutiny attaches to licensed operators who opt to obtain sports
gaming data outside the proscribed channels or (ii) licensed operators will adopt
an offensive litigation strategy to counteract any mandate. In the absence of such
mandates, issues surrounding collecting and disseminating sports gaming data
will persist. For example, litigation will likely ensue if efforts are undertaken by
sporting event organizers to restrict the flow of news and information relevant to
sports gaming.
III. POTENTIAL REGULATORY SCRUTINY
MARKET IN THE UNITED STATES

OF THE

SPORTS GAMING DATA

A. Federal
Congress has a long history of passing legislation specific to sports gaming.
Examples include the Wire Act of 1961,87 the Sports Bribery Act of 1964,88
PASPA in 1992,89 and the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of
2006.90 Eight years after PASPA, Congress also considered revising the statute
to prohibit betting on high school and college sports nationwide, with no

87
88
89
90

18 U.S.C. § 1084.
18. U.S.C. § 224.
28 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3704.
31 U.S.C. §§ 5361-5367.
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grandfathered-in exemption for Nevada.91 From the 106th Congress (1999-2000)
to the 112th Congress (2011-2012), federal lawmakers also considered a host of
other legislative bills that would have impacted the sports gaming space.92
Although nothing on-point has been enacted as of June 20, 2020, Congress has
preliminarily addressed regulatory issues pertaining to sports betting news,
information, and data in response to the recent Supreme Court ruling. On
December 19, 2018, ex-Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) and Senator Chuck
Schumer (D-NY) co-introduced the Sports Wagering Market Integrity Act of
2018, with sports betting data described as “one of the difficult issues to be
considered as part of the sports wagering discussion.”93 The draft bill defined
‘Authorized Data’ as follows:
(5) AUTHORIZED DATA.—(A) RESULT OF A SPORTS WAGER.—(A)
MARKET TRANSITION PERIOD.—With respect to any sports wager
accepted on or before December 31, 2024, provide that a sports
wagering operator shall determine the result of a sports wager only
with data that is licensed and provided by—(I) the applicable sports

91

The Senate version of the bill sponsored by Sen. John McCain (R-AZ) was S.
2021: High School and College Gambling Prohibition Act. The House version of the
same bill was H.R. 3575: Student Athlete Protection Act. Neither bill became law.
92
See Anastasios Kaburakis & Ryan Rodenberg, Gambling Sausage: Federal
Legislation in the New Millenium, 16 GAMING L. REV. ECON. 500, 505 (2012).
93
115 CONG. REC. S7930 (Statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch (for himself and for Sen.
Charles Schumer)) (2018) (mentioning “the basis for requiring the use of so-called
official league data”). If Congress were to legislate in the sports gaming space, one
key issue would be whether any such legislation would treat all states equally or—
as illustrated by PASPA’s unequal treatment of states—include differing standards
among the states. Any differing treatment raises equal sovereignty concerns. See
Ryan M. Rodenberg & John T. Holden, Sports Betting has an Equal Sovereignty
Problem, 67 DUKE L. J. ONLINE 1, 4 (2017). The 2018 draft bill received widespread
public support from U.S.-based sports leagues. For example, the United States
Tennis Association (“USTA”) wrote a two-page letter to then-Senator Hatch and
Senator Schumer to “enthusiastically add our voice to the coalition of sport
organizations that seek a national framework for sport wagering.” Letter from
Gordon A. Smith, Chief Executive Officer and Executive Director, USTA to The
Honorable Orrin Hatch and The Honorable Chuck Schumer (December 19, 2018)
(on file with author). While the 2018 draft legislation delegated regulatory oversight
to the DOJ, other federal agencies—such as the CFTC—could also be possibilities.
For a recent such proposal, see David Aron & Alexander Kane,
Federal Regulation Could Sweeten the Sports Betting Pot, BLOOMBERG (June 9,
2020), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/insight-federalregulation-could-sweeten-the-sports-betting-pot.
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organization; or (II) an entity expressly authorized by the applicable
sports organization to provide such information.94
If Congress were to recycle the foregoing data-specific language in a
subsequent sports gaming bill, the data-specific clause could face legal scrutiny
on multiple fronts. Such was the case for PASPA years before the Supreme Court
declared PASPA unconstitutional. For example, in the course of discussing
PASPA’s carve-outs for certain states, the Court found such exemptions derived
from “obscured Congressional purposes.”95 The Department of Justice (“DOJ”)
raised other concerns: “It is particularly troubling that [PASPA] would permit
enforcement of its provisions by sports leagues.”96 Further, according to the DOJ:
“[I]t is left to the states to decide whether to permit gambling activities based
upon sporting events.”97
Such sentiments reinforce how potentially problematic it would be if federal
legislation was passed bent on usurping or overriding existing state statues.98
This is particularly relevant in the current environment where no fewer than 19
states—as of June 20, 2020—have enacted legislation following the Supreme
Court’s 2018 ruling.99 Likewise, there are a multitude of state laws still on the
books across the country with differing definitions of what constitutes
gambling.100 These factors make a one-size-fits-all federal approach difficult.
94
Sports Wagering Market Integrity Act of 2018, S. 3793, 115th Cong. (2018). The
reference to the 2024 date in the draft bill represented a sunset provision, which may
have been included in an attempt to satisfy the “limited Times” requirement in the
Constitution’s Intellectual Property Clause.
95
Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 179 (1999).
96
Letter from W. Lee Rawls, Asst. Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, to the Hon. Joseph
R. Biden, Jr., Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate (Sept. 24, 1991) (on
file with author).
97
Id.
98
Beyond preemption, issues also arise if any forthcoming federal legislation
included one or more grandfather clauses for certain (or all) states. For a discussion
of sports gaming regulation vis-à-vis grandfather clauses in the context of PASPA,
see John T. Holden, et al., Sports Gambling Regulation and Your Grandfather
(Clause), 26 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. ONLINE 1 (2014).
99
Ryan Rodenberg, Over a Third of the U.S. Can Legally
Bet on Sports: Here’s an Updated Map, ESPN (June 10, 2020), https://www.espn.
com/chalk/story/_/id/29170044/over-third-us-legally-bet-sports-here-updated-map.
100
Ryan Rodenberg, Why Do States Define Gambling Differently? ESPN
(Feb. 18, 2016), https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/14799507/daily-fantasywhy-do-states-define-gambling-differently. With many states having statutes that
turn on relative levels of skill and chance involved, there have been a variety of legal
arguments about where sports betting falls on the skill-chance spectrum. For
example, see Ryan Rodenberg, Documents Show

Fall 2020]

REGULATING SPORTS GAMING DATA

35

B. Statutory
a. Antitrust
Antitrust laws serve as a “safeguard for the Nation’s free market
structures.”101 Such laws, including the Sherman Act,102 prohibit “cartels, price
fixing, and other combinations or practices that undermine the free market.”103
In 2010, the Supreme Court—in American Needle v. NFL104—provided a primer
on the reach of the Sherman Act:
The meaning of the term “contract, combination . . ., or conspiracy” is
informed by the basic distinction in the Sherman Act between
concerted and independent action that distinguishes § 1 of the Sherman
Act from § 2. Section 1 applies only to concerted action that restrains
trade. Section 2, by contrast, covers both concerted and independent
action, but only if that action “monopolize[s],” 15 U.S.C. § 2, or
“threatens actual monopolization,” a category that is narrower than
restraint of trade. Monopoly power may be equally harmful whether it
is the product of joint action or individual action. Thus, in § 1
Congress “treated concerted behavior more strictly than unilateral
behavior.” This is so because unlike independent action, “[c]oncerted
activity inherently is fraught with anticompetitive risk” insofar as it
“deprives the marketplace of independent centers of decisionmaking
that competition assumes and demands.” For these reasons, § 1
prohibits any concerted action “in restraint of trade or commerce,”
even if the action does not “threate[n] monopolization,” ibid. And
therefore, an arrangement must embody concerted action in order to be
a “contract, combination . . ., or conspiracy” under § 1. We have long
held that concerted action under § 1 does not turn simply on whether
the parties involved are legally distinct entities. Instead, we have
eschewed such formalistic distinctions in favor of a functional
consideration of how the parties involved in the alleged
anticompetitive conduct actually operate. As a result, we have
repeatedly found instances in which members of a legally single entity

DOJ, NFL Have Argued that Sports Betting is Skill-Based, ESPN (Jul. 16, 2015),
https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/13268458/documents-show-justicedepartment-nfl-argued-skill-sports-betting.
101
N.C. State Bd. Of Dental Exam’rs v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1109
(2015).
102
15 U.S.C. § 1.
103
N.C. State Bd. Of Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1109.
104
American Needle v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 190-91 (2010).
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violated § 1 when the entity was controlled by a group of competitors
and served, in essence, as a vehicle for ongoing concerted activity.105
Antitrust concerns in the burgeoning sports gaming data market are
commonplace.106 According to an executive from William Hill:
A final related policy concern involves the inclusion of a requirement
to purchase what sports leagues have deemed ‘official league data.’
Mandating the use of ‘official league data’ just results in monopoly
pricing power for the professional sports leagues. Federal courts have
rejected the assertion that professional sports leagues have any
intellectual property rights to data, further ruling that it is public
information. This is simply an attempt by professional sports leagues
to legislate what courts have rejected for decades.107
According the media reports, the issue arose in the context of a 2018
Connecticut legislative hearing too:

105

Id. (internal quotes and citations omitted). In a footnote, the Supreme Court also
made an observation germane to the pooling of purported sports gaming ‘data rights:’
“In any event, it simply is not apparent that the alleged conduct was necessary at all.
Although two teams are needed to play a football game, not all aspects of elaborate
interleague cooperation are necessary to produce a game. Moreover, even if league
wide agreements are necessary to produce football, it does not follow that concerted
activity in marketing intellectual property is necessary to produce football.” Id. at
214, n. 7.
106
For media coverage of the issue, see Matt Rybaltowski, Tempers Flare at Panel
on Official Sports Betting Data Requirements, SPORTS HANDLE (May 17, 2019),
https://sportshandle.com/official-data-conference-panel/; James Kilsby, Battle Over
Official Data Being Fought on Many Fronts, GAMBLING COMPLIANCE (May 21,
2019), https://gamblingcompliance.com/premium-content/insights_analysis/battleover-official-data-being-fought-many-fronts; Regina Garcia, NBA, MLB Using Data
to Chase Better Deals with Sportsbooks, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jun. 8, 2019)
https://apnews.com/fe1cb6a75efe4f77be41ec6ff8664069; Matt Rybaltowski, As
States Consider Anti-Courtsiding Measures, Debate on Transmission of Live Data
Intensifies, SPORTS HANDLE (Jul. 10, 2019), https://sportshandle.com/state-anticourtsiding-measures/; Matt Carey, U.S. Sports Leagues Continue to Push Official
Data, but Operators Balk at Cost, GAMBLING COMPLIANCE (Apr. 26, 2019),
https://gamblingcompliance.com/premium-content/insights_analysis/us-sportsleagues-continue-push-official-data-operators-balk-cost;
Matt
Rybaltowski,
Shakedown Fees: NBA, MLB Demanding Nevada Sportsbooks Pay More or Get Cut
Off, SPORTS HANDLE (May 2, 2019), https://sportshandle.com/nba-mlb-demandsdata-fee-nv-sportsbooks/.
107
Sports Betting with a Mobile Component in New York State: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on Racing, Gaming, and Wagering (2019) (statement of Danielle Boyd,
William Will executive).
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Rep. Craig Fishbein noted that this [sports betting data] requirement
gives the leagues exclusivity in the space. “Wouldn’t that be allowing
the private monopoly of data?” [Fishbein] asked. [Major League
Baseball executive Bryan] Seeley confirmed, though he tried to frame
the request. “This is driven from consumer concerns, not money
concerns,” [Seeley] said. “But I understand.” [Seeley] argued that
illegal bookmakers have monopolies on their data, too. Fishbein
suggested letting the market dictate which stat[istics] providers are
best.108
Restraints of trade alleged to be in violation of the antitrust laws—such as
horizontal/vertical price fixing arrangements, output restrictions, and market
divisions outside the sports context—are sometimes considered per se
unreasonable, but the ‘rule of reason’ test is most commonly applied in the sports
industry given the unique aspects of sports whereby they “can only be carried
out jointly.”109 Under the rule of reason test, the Supreme Court examines “the
facts peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint, and the reasons why it
was imposed.”110 Among other things, plaintiffs must identify an injury that is
“attributable to an anti-competitive aspect of the practice under scrutiny.”111 For
example, in the case of a horizontal agreement between competitors—such as
teams in a sports league—the injury requirement can be shown in at least three
ways: (i) a reduction in competitors’ decision-making about “whether and how
often to offer to provide services;”112 (ii) a demonstrated fixing of prices;113 or
(iii) a limitations on competitors “freedom to compete.”114 Vertical arrangements
can give rise to antitrust issues too, provided the plaintiffs have standing under
the Supreme Court’s ‘indirect purchaser’ rule.115
Among states that have laws requiring licensed operators to use so-called
‘official data’ for certain types of bets,116 the statutory language is largely
uniform: such data must be purchased from a sports league or the league’s
designee(s). The latter arrangement—where mandatory data dissemination is
108

Eric Ramsey, Connecticut Lawmakers Not Interested in ‘Lining The Pockets’ Of
NBA, MLB Through Sports Betting, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Mar. 2, 2018),
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/18812/connecticut-hearing-on-sports-betting/.
109
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984).
110
Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 1355, 1365 (1978).
111
Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 110 S. Ct. 1884, 1889 (1990).
112
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Superior Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 110 S. Ct. 768, 774
(1990).
113
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil, Co., 60 S. Ct. 811, 844 (1940).
114
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 106 (1984).
115
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S. Ct. 2061, 2074-75 (1977).
116
As of June 20, 2020, such states included Tennessee, Michigan, and Illinois. As
of July 1, 2020, Virginia will move into the same category too.
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facilitated by one or more designees—could plausibly be described as joint
venture. Indeed, in many cases, sports leagues and individual team owners are
equity investors in the data dissemination firms.117 To the extent that contractual
arrangements in the sports gaming data dissemination space amount to joint
ventures, the Supreme Court has set forth guidelines for antitrust scrutiny. In
Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, for example, the Court applied the rule of reason to joint
ventures and required plaintiffs to “demonstrate that a particular contract or
combination is in fact unreasonable and anticompetitive before it will be found
unlawful.”118 Specifically, “if the joint venture restricts price or output, the rule
of reason test generally applies.”119
In addition to joint ventures, antitrust scrutiny also extends to tying
arrangements that could fix prices or limit market entry. A tying arrangement
usually occurs when “a seller of two separate products refuses to sell one unless
the buyer also takes the other, either simultaneously or else as aftermarket
purchases.”120 Put another way, a tie results if a consumer is only allowed to
purchase one item from a company (which the consumer wants) if the consumer
also agrees to purchase another item (which the consumer does not want) from
the same company.121 The antitrust harm from tying takes two forms:
“Foreclosure occurs when a tie ousts or unreasonably limits the opportunities of
rivals, typically in the tied product…[t]he second type of antitrust harm is
extraction, which involves overcharges that purchasers of tied packages are
forced to pay.”122
Antitrust concerns are central in cases when active market participants play
a role in the regulatory process. The Supreme Court has found that “prohibitions

117

See Daniel Kaplan & Eric Fisher, NFL Buys Stake in Stats Firm: Europe’s
Sportradar Will Replace Stats LLC, SPORTS BUS. J. (Apr. 20, 2015),
https://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2015/04/20/Leagues-andGoverning-Bodies/NFL-sportradar.aspx. See also Scott Soshnick, Jordan, Cuban,
Leonsis Put Millions on Sports Betting’s Future, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 27, 2015),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-27/jordan-cuban-leonsis-putmillions-on-sports-betting-s-future.
118
Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 126 S .Ct. 1276, 1279 (2006).
119
Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 99 S. Ct. 1551, 1564 (1979)
(“Not all arrangements among actual potential competitors that have an impact on
price are per se violations of the Sherman Act…[j]oint ventures and other
cooperative arrangements are also not statutorily unlawful, at least not as price-fixing
schemes, where the agreement on price is necessary to market the product at all.”).
120
Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Nonexcluding Ties U. IOWA C. OF L. (2012).
121
Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly
Profit Theorm, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397, 466-67 (2009) (discussing price squeezing
on two products).
122
Erik Hovenkamp &Herbert Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements and Antitrust
Harm, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 925, 927 (2010).
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against anti-competitive self-regulation by active market participants are an
axiom of federal antitrust policy.”123 Similarly, Justice Stevens, dissenting in a
different case, posited that “[t]he risk that private regulation of market entry,
prices, or output may be designed to confer monopoly profits on members of an
industry at the expense of the consuming public has been the central concern
of…our antitrust jurisprudence.”124
The restrictive and intertwined nature of the sports gaming data market lends
itself to antitrust scrutiny. A variety of different plaintiffs—government or
private—could bring a host of different claims and a number of different theories.
Beyond antitrust prosecution by the DOJ or one or more state attorneys general,
other potential plaintiffs could initiate a lawsuit, including consumers, sports
gaming operators, or aggrieved data dissemination firms locked out of the market
due to exclusive arrangements or restrictive access policies. Likewise, if sports
leagues or players unions moved to unilaterally adopt certain data policies,
individual team owners or players could challenge such moves on antitrust
grounds or otherwise.125
b. Statutory Data Monopolies and the State-Action Antitrust Exemption
The doctrine of state-action antitrust immunity found its genesis in the
Supreme Court’s Parker v. Brown decision.126 There, the Court held that the
federal antitrust laws may not bar states from imposing market restrains because
123

N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. FTC, 574 U.S. 494, 494 (2015).
Hoover v. Ronwin, 104 S. Ct. 1989, 2003 (1984) (J. Stevens dissenting).
125
For an example of a team owner seeking to opt-out of a league-wide commercial
arrangement, see NFL Properties, Inc. v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd. 922
F.Supp. 849, 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
126
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 307, 314 (1943). A related concept—particularly if
there is ever a federal regulatory effort in the context of sports gaming data—is the
extent to which the doctrine of implied antitrust immunity potentially attaches. The
Supreme Court concluded that “[r]epeals of the antitrust laws by implication from a
regulatory statute are strongly disfavored, and have only been found in cases of plain
repugnancy between the antitrust and regulatory provisions.” United States v.
Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 83 S. Ct. 1715, 1734 (1963). In recent years, the doctrine
has “considerably evolved.” Barak Orbach, The Implied Antitrust Immunity,
(Ariz Legal Stud. Pub. Discussion Paper No. 14-16, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=
2477137. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP 540
U.S. 398 (2004); Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383,
2389, (2007) (“Where regulatory statutes are silent in respect to antitrust, …courts
must determine whether, and in what respects, they implicitly preclude application
of the antitrust laws. Those determinations may vary from statute to statute,
depending upon the relation between the antitrust laws and the regulatory program
set forth in the particular statute, and the relation of the specific conduct at issue to
both sets of laws.”).
124
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“‘nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history’ suggested that
Congress intended to restrict the sovereign capacity of the States to regulate their
economies.”127 While the Sherman Act “serves to promote robust
competition”128 nationwide, states sometimes “impose restrictions on
occupations, confer exclusive or shared rights to dominate a market, or otherwise
limit competition to achieve public objectives.”129 However, if all state activity
in these realms resulted in antitrust liability, “federal antitrust law would impose
an impermissible burden on the states’ power to regulate.”130
Enter state-action antitrust immunity. The ‘burden’ recognized by the
Supreme Court gave way to an interpretation of the antitrust laws that
“confer[ed] immunity on anticompetitive conduct by the states when acting in
the their sovereign capacity.”131 Such immunity “embod[ies] in the Sherman Act
the federalism principle that the states possess a significant measure of
sovereignty under our Constitution.”132 However, a finding of state-action
antitrust immunity is generally “disfavored.”133
The difficult application of this principle occurs when “a state delegates
control over a market to a nonsovereign actor,” like a regulatory board.134 In such
cases, the Supreme Court has enunciated a two-part test, recognizing that
“‘[c]loser analysis is required when the activity at issue is not directly that of”
the state itself, but rather ‘is carried out by others pursuant to state
authorization.’”135 Namely, “a non-sovereign actor controlled by active market
participants—such as [a B]oard—enjoys Parker immunity only if it satisfies two
requirements: first that the ‘challenged restraint…be one clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed as state policy,’ and second that the ‘the policy…be
actively supervised by the state.’”136 This dual test derives from a recognition
that:

127

Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1003, 1010
(2013) (quoting Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350 (1943)).
128
N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 1101,
1109 (2015).
129
Id.
130
Id. at 1109 (citing Exxon Corp. v. Gov. of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 133 (1978).
131
Id. at 1110 (quoting Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943)).
132
Community Commun. Co. v. Boulder, 102 S. Ct. 835, 842 (1982).
133
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 112 S. Ct. 2169, 2178 (1992).
134
N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 1101,
1110 (2015).
135
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1003, 1010
(2013) (citing Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 568 (1984)).
136
N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 1101,
1110 (2015) (quoting California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum,
Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 115 (1980)).
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Limits on state-action immunity are most essential when the state
seeks to delegate its regulatory power to active market participants, for
established ethical standards may blend with private anticompetitive
motives in a way difficult even for market participants to discern. Dual
allegiances are not always apparent to an actor. In consequence, active
market participants cannot be allowed to regulate their own markets
free from antitrust accountability.137
Passing the two-part test represents a high hurdle for states looking for
immunity to attach. To satisfy the ‘clear articulation’ prong, “the displacement
of competition [must be] the ‘inherent, logical, or ordinary result of the exercise
of authority delegated by the state legislature. In that scenario, the state must
have foreseen and implicitly endorsed the anticompetitive effects as consistent
with its policy goals.’”138 The ‘active supervision’ requirement mandates “that
state officials have and exercise power to review particular anticompetitive acts
of private parties and disapprove those that fail to accord with state policy.”139
Among the states that have already enacted an ‘official data’ statutory
mandate, there is scant evidence that lawmakers in Tennessee, Michigan, or
Illinois have enunciated why—or how—such a data law is consistent with state
policy. Beyond effective lobbying by industry stakeholders with a pecuniary
incentive to pursue such a statutory mandate, the policy-enhancing motivation is
dubious. As such, supporters of the laws may have difficulty arguing that the
restraints are clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy.
Shifting regulatory standards for what constitutes ‘commercially reasonable’
pricing and deference to industry stakeholders may doom such laws under the
second Parker prong. Active state supervision is required, which is a high
standard to meet when the underlying regulations look to industry-tethered
metrics and off-loaded boards comprised of private sector industry employees,
as is the case in Tennessee.
C. Constitutional
Several constitutional provisions impact the regulatory treatment of sports
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Id. at 1111 (citing California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum,
Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 106 (1980) (“The national policy in favor of competition cannot
be thwarted by casting [a] gauzy cloak of state involvement over what is essentially
a private price-fixing arrangement”).
138
Id. at 1112 (citing Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 133
S. Ct. 1003, 1013 (2013)).
139
Id. (citing Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 101 (1988).
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gaming data, especially if any sui generis property right were to attach.140 Article
I’s Intellectual Property Clause grants Congress the authority: “To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”141 The Supreme Court has set forth general parameters on the
power of Congress to grant monopolies such as an ‘official data’ requirement for
sports gaming. According to the Court: “The monopoly privileges that Congress
may authorize are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special
private benefit…[it] is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and
inventors.”142
Prominent scholars agree: “[a] corollary principle [of the Intellectual
Property Clause] demands that Congress initially direct exclusive grants to those
who provide the public with the new creation. Monopolies are not rewards
Congress may grant to favored special-interest groups.”143 Another scholar
concurred: “The overwhelming view among commentators is that the Intellectual
Property Clause’s limits apply to all of Congress’s powers and therefore that
Congress may not look to other Article I, Section 8 powers in order to avoid
those limits.144 Indeed, the Intellectual Property Clause has anti-monopoly
origins145 and its ‘promotion of progress’ requirement limits the power of
Congress in the intellectual property realm.146
A federal mandate that sports betting operators—as a condition of receiving
and retaining a license—must use data purchased from a sports league or its
140

Whether there is a constitutional right to advertise about sports gaming options
is beyond the scope of this paper. See generally United States v. Edge Broad. Co.,
509 U.S. 418 (1993). Likewise, whether there is a constitutional right to bet on sports
is outside the scope of this paper. See generally Dustin Gouker, An NFL Team Wants
You to Vote to ‘Protect Your Right to Legally Bet on Sports’, LEGAL SPORTS REPORT
(Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.legalsportsreports.com/25655/miami-dolphins-pluglegal-sports-betting/.
141
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
142
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
143
Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The
Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1119, 1164 (2000).
144
Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 272, 274 (2004).
145
Tyler T. Ochoa & Mark Rose, The Anti-Monopoly Origins of the Patent and
Copyright Clause, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 909 passim (2002) (Ochoa
and Rose note that the Supreme Court rejected the possibility of a perpetual copyright
via common law in an 1834 case). See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 684–85
(1834).
146
Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of
Progress as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. L. J.
1771 passim (2006).
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designee can plausibly be described as the functional equivalent of a patent. The
Supreme Court has made clear that Congress has limited patent powers given the
Constitution’s Intellectual Property Clause:
Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose
effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public
domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available.
Innovation, advancement, and things which add to the sum of
useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent system
which by constitutional command must ‘promote the Progress
of…useful Arts.’ This is the standard expressed in the
Constitution and it may not be ignored.147
Protecting sports gaming data via copyright—a topic that has indirectly
already been litigated and is discussed elsewhere herein—is unlikely. In contrast
to “live musicals, theatrical plays, and professional wrestling, honestly
competitive sports are unscripted, making them incompatible with copyright
law’s constitutional and statutory requirements.”148 The DOJ Solicitor General
has cited live sports to illustrate the concept too: “In some circumstances,
moreover, the initial ‘performance’ may be the act of transmission itself. For
example, when a television network broadcasts a live sporting event, no
underlying performance precedes the initial transmission—the telecast itself is
the only copyrighted work.”149 Disparate court rulings about narrow, discrete
issues in this space has seemingly resulted in an inter-circuit split between the
Second Circuit150 and the Eleventh Circuit151 and a plausible intra-circuit split
within the Eighth Circuit.152
Beyond the Intellectual Property Clause, other constitutional concerns that
could arise in the sports gaming data context include the Due Process Clause,
Tenth Amendment, Takings Clause, and First Amendment. For example, a state
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Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (emphasis omitted).
Ryan M. Rodenberg et al., “Whose” Game Is It? Sports-Wagering and
Intellectual Property, 60 VILL. L. REV. TOLLE LEGE 1, 6 (2014).
149
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 26, Am.
Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. 431 (2014) (No. 13-461) (citing NBA v.
Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 846-847 (2d Cir. 1997)).
150
See NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 843 (2d Cir. 1997).
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See Morris Commc’ns Corp. v. PGA Tour, Inc., 364 F.3d 1288, 1296, 1298 (11th
Cir. 2004).
152
See C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. MLB Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d
818, 824 (8th Cir. 2007); see also NFL v. McBee & Bruno’s, Inc., 792 F.2d 726, 732
(8th Cir. 1986). For further discussion, see Rodenberg, supra note 148, at 6.
148

44

UNLV GAMING LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 11:1

challenging any new federal regulatory statute—upon establishing standing153—
could, among other claims, challenge the law on the same anti-commandeering
grounds that New Jersey successfully argued in the context of PASPA. Likewise,
if Nevada’s long-standing regulatory process were to be usurped by federal
efforts, a Takings Clause claim could be triggered.
a. Void-For-Vagueness
The roots of the void-for-vagueness doctrine are firmly in the Due Process
Clause.154 If a law is “so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain
as to the conduct it prohibits,”155 then the statute does not provide fair notice as
required by the Due Process Clause. Put another way, such a vague law lacks fair
notice because “[it] leaves judges and jurors free to decide, without any legally
fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is not in each particular case.”156
The void-for-vagueness doctrine could also attach if the law in question does not
“establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement” and “encourage[s]
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”157 Courts have evaluated this test
with an eye towards whether police would, or could, enforce the law.158 If
determined to be unconstitutionally vague, a court would then construe the law
narrowly to avoid the vagueness or invalidate the entire statute.159
Although the void-for-vagueness standard is most commonly at play in
criminal law, it also applies to civil statutes.160 However, the Supreme Court has
found that “[t]he degree of vagueness that the Constitution [allows]…depends in
part on the nature of the enactment…express[ing] greater tolerance of
enactments with civil rather than criminal penalties because the consequences of
imprecision are qualitatively less severe.”161 Lesser scrutiny has been found
appropriate for economic regulatory laws “because its subject matter is often
more narrow, and because businesses, which face economic demands to plan
153

Ryan M. Rodenberg, ‘Standing’ Up for State Rights in Sports Betting, 30 J.
LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 142, passim (2020).
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United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008).
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Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402 (1966) (citing Baggett v. Bullitt, 377
U.S. 360, 367 (1964); Lanzetta v. New Jersey 306 U.S. 451, 453, (1939)). See
Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 595(2015) (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461
U.S. 352, 357–58 (1983)).
156
Giaccio, 382 U.S.at 402–03 (citing Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 367 (1964);
Lanzetta v. New Jersey 306 U.S. 451, 453, (1939)).
157
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357–58 (1983).
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Id. at 358.
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See City of Chi. v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 61–64 (1999).
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Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1213 (2018).
161
Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498–
99 (1982) (footnotes omitted).
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behavior carefully, can be expected to consult relevant legislation in advance of
action.”162 That notwithstanding, if the economic regulatory law threatens a
constitutional right, such as free speech under the First Amendment, “a more
stringent vagueness test should apply.”163
Statutory ‘official data’ mandates with or without ‘commercially reasonable’
standards in sports gaming legislation are close cousins to excessive-price
lawmaking in other contexts, such as prescription drugs.164 Two regulatory
moves in the realm of sports gaming data are susceptible to the void-forvagueness doctrine. First, any statutory mandate—at the state or federal level—
requiring operators to purchase so-called ‘official data’ from a designated seller
or sellers is clouded by precedent concluding that such information is (already)
in the public domain and unowned. Second, some states have attached a
‘commercially reasonable’ standard to the prices of such mandates. In so doing,
the states are, paradoxically and nonsensically, trying to attach a price to
something that has no definitive owner.
First Amendment overbreadth is a cousin of the void-for-vagueness doctrine.
The Supreme Court has found that “[t]he Constitution gives significant
protection from overbroad laws that chill speech within the First Amendment’s
vast and privileged sphere.”165 In First Amendment cases, statutes can be
invalidated as overbroad if “a substantial number of its applications are
unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”166
Given the possibility of a chilling effect, a person whose activity is unprotected
may have standing to challenge a law as overbroad under the First
Amendment.167 Any state law purporting to restrict the ability of individuals to
transmit news and information from a sports venue—such as the score of the
underlying game—is vulnerable to invalidation under a First Amendment
overbreadth claim due to the vast net cast by such a law.
b. First Amendment and Prior Restraints
Any government-mandated restrictions on the dissemination of news and
162

Id. at 498 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 499; see also FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253–54
(2012) (“When speech is involved, rigorous adherence to those [vagueness]
requirements is necessary to ensure that ambiguity does not chill protected speech.”).
164
See Michelle M. Mello & Rebecca E. Wolitz, Legal Strategies for Reining in
“Unconscionable” Prices for Prescription Drugs, 114 NW. L. REV. 859 passim
(2020) (discussing unconscionable drug prices in the context of the Due Process
Clause).
165
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 244 (2002).
166
United States. v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010) (quoting Wash. State Grange
v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449, n.6 (2008)).
167
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 (1982).
163
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information—such as via statutory ‘official data’ requirements in the sports
gaming realm—invites scrutiny under the First Amendment. The Supreme Court
has found “speech on public issues…is entitled to special protection.”168 Snyder
v. Phelps detailed when such protection attaches: “Speech deals with matters of
public concern when it can ‘be fairly considered as relating to any matter of
political, social, or other concern to the community,’ or when it ‘is a subject of
legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value and
concern to the public.’”169 In a recent court filing, two sports industry
stakeholders explained how sports satisfy Snyder’s defendant-friendly two-part
test: “Courts broadly construe ‘matters of public concern’ to encompass news
reports about all manner of subjects of interest to substantial portions of the
public, including news about sports and entertainment.”170
Relatedly, sports league executives have described sports in a similar way.
In a 2012 deposition, MLB executive Bud Selig described pro baseball as a
“quasi-public institution.”171 In a 2018 submission for a Congressional hearing,
NFL executive Jocelyn Moore referenced “our nation’s professional and amateur
sporting contests.”172 A leading scholar has found that courts are adverse to
limiting the dissemination of information if involving a public concern, even if
having commercial value.173 Indeed, “[a]n individual’s right to speak is
implicated when information he or she possesses is subjected to ‘restraints on the
way in which information might be used’ or disseminated.”174
Application of the First Amendment is also shaped by the state action
168

Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
138, 145 (1983)).
169
Id. at 453 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 146; City of San Diego, Cal. V. Roe,
543 U.S. 77, 83–84 (2011)).
170
Brief for Fox Broad. Co. & Big Ten Network, LLC as Amici Curiae Supporting
Defendant NCAA’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 4, In re NCAA StudentAthlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 37 F.Supp.3d 1126 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (No.
C 09-1967 CW) (citing Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894, 908 (9th Cir. 2010)).
171
Deposition of Allan H. Selig at 10, NCAA v. Christie 926 F.Supp.2d 551 (D. NJ
2013) (No. 12–4947) (“…baseball is a social institution. I believe that. I also believe
it’s a quasi-public institution. But it’s a social institution with really important social
responsibility.”) (on file with author).
172
Post-PASPA: An Examination of Sports Betting in America: Hearing on RHOB
2141 Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Sec., and Investigations
of the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 1(2018) (statement of Jocelyn Moore,
Exec. Vice President, Commc’ns and Pub. Affairs, NFL).
173
Dianne Leenheer Zimmerman, Information as Speech, Information as Goods:
Some Thoughts on Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV.
665, 667 (1992).
174
Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 568 (2011) (quoting Seattle Times Co.
v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32 (1984)).
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doctrine, requiring a government actor to be involved. Specifically, “the First and
Fourteenth Amendments are limitations on state action, not on action by the
owner of private property used only for private purposes.”175 Put another way,
the First Amendment’s free speech clause “prohibits only governmental
abridgment of speech…[and]…does not prohibit private abridgment of
speech.”176 In deducing the divide between public and private action, the
Supreme Court has concluded: “we say that state action may be found if, though
only if, there is such a ‘close nexus between the State and the challenged action’
that seemingly private behavior ‘may be fairly treated as that of the State
itself.’”177 While some sports venues in the United States are privately owned,
most are on public land or take place in publicly-financed stadiums. Enforcement
of any ‘official data’ mandates on-site would likely be left to private security
forces or duly-authorized law enforcement officials.
Dissemination of news and information—whether related to sports gaming
or not—occurring on public land and involving a state actor almost certainly
triggers the First Amendment. First Amendment coverage on private land with
no state action is less certain, given that private property does not “lose its private
character merely because the public is generally invited to use it for designated
purposes.”178 In PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, the Supreme Court left
open the possibility that private landowners’ right to suppress free speech had
limits.179 In either case, a sports gaming data disseminator could adopt an
offensive litigation strategy and preemptively seek to have any state or federal
‘official data’ mandate declared to be an unconstitutional prior restraint or, more
generally, file for a declaratory judgment about ownership of real-time data
involving sporting events.180
The content of the involved speech and its classification also plays a role in
any First Amendment analysis. Certain speech—such as incitement of
lawlessness, defamation, and obscenity—fall into a category of unprotected
speech.181 Speech in support of a commercial venture has been extended First
175

Cent. Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 547 (1972); see also Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 936-37 (1982).
176
Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1928 (2019).
177
Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295
(2001) (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)).
178
Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 569 (1972).
179
PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 76–77 (1980).
180
See generally NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 846 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating
the Second Circuit’s conclusion that a live sporting event, on its own, does not
constitute an “original work of authorship” under copyright law).
181
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 245–246 (2002) (citing Simon &
Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 127
(1991)).
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Amendment protection if it meets the Supreme Court’s Central Hudson four-part
test:
[I]f the communication is neither misleading nor related to
unlawful activity, the government's power is more
circumscribed. The State must assert a substantial interest to be
achieved by restrictions on commercial speech. Moreover, the
regulatory technique must be in proportion to that interest. The
limitation on expression must be designed carefully to achieve
the State’s goal.182
Speech involving cultural, social, or political discourse is fully protected
under the First Amendment,183 with multiple courts extending such protection to
entertainment-related news.184 The Supreme Court has found that this extends to
newsworthy items in literary works: “[t]he news element—the information
respecting current events contained in the literary production—is not the creation
of the writer, but is a report of matters that ordinarily are publici juris; it is the
history of the day.”185 Free speech rights vis-à-vis real-time news has also been
addressed at the appellate court level, with the Second Circuit concluding that
the right to “make news…does not give rise to a right for [an entity] to control
who breaks that news and how.”186
In any pre-enforcement ‘as applied’ First Amendment challenge involving
statutory mandates regarding sports gaming data, the plaintiff would first need
to establish Article III standing.187 Upon a finding of standing, any case brought
by a disfavored data disseminator or sports gaming operator would turn to the
merits; namely, whether a federal or state mandate restricting the distribution of
news and information relevant to sports gaming complies with the First
Amendment. Similarly, if any such mandate represents a prior restraint, there is
a “heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.”188 Prior restraints, the
Supreme Court has found, represent “the most serious and the least tolerable
182

Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
564 (1980).
183
Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
184
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 500–02 (1952); Winters v. N.Y.,
333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948).
185
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985)
(quoting Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234 (1918)).
186
Barclays Capital Inc. v. TheFlyontheWall.com, Inc., 650 F.3d 876, 907 (2d Cir.
2011).
187
The Supreme Court has set forth a multi-pronged test to satisfy Article III’s
standing requirement. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016);
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
188
Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971).
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infringement on First Amendment rights.”189
The First Amendment generally stands for the proposition that “government
has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject
matter, or its content.”190 The right to publish truthful information of a public
concern is one of the “core purposes” of the First Amendment flagged by the
Supreme Court.191 Regulations based on content are “presumptively invalid,”
with the “Government bear[ing] the burden to rebut that presumption.”192 When
government regulations restrict certain content—such as live scores being
disseminated on-site at a sporting event—a court evaluating the permissibility of
such restrictions must determine whether to apply strict scrutiny or intermediate
scrutiny.193 If a strict scrutiny standard were to attach, any statutory sports
gaming data mandate would only be upheld if “it is justified by a compelling
government interest and is narrowly drawn to serve that interest.”194 The
Supreme Court’s intermediate scrutiny standard makes content restrictions
permissible only when narrowly drawn and in furtherance of a substantial
government interest.195 Whether there is a compelling or substantial government
interest in restricting sports gaming news and information is dubious.
Although the Second Circuit ultimately did not reach the issue in NBA v.
Motorola,196 First Amendment issues were briefed extensively by the parties and
amici. For example, amici New York Times emphasized the importance of the
case:
The Supreme Court has consistently emphasized that the constitutional
guarantee of free speech and a free press are neither limited nor
enhanced by economic considerations. See, e.g., New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964). It is similarly beyond question that
real-time sports scores, particularly in widely popular professional
NBA basketball games, constitute news entitled to First Amendment
protection and status. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting
Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977) (“There is no doubt that entertainment,
as well as news, enjoys First Amendment protection. It is also true that

189

Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002).
191
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533 (2001).
192
United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 817 (2000).
193
The Ninth Circuit recently applied strict scrutiny to a content-based restriction
on speech. See IMDb.com Inc. v. Becerra, 962 F. 3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2020).
194
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011).
195
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968).
196
NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 854 n.10 (1997) (“In view of our
disposition of this matter [on alternative grounds], we need not address [defendants’]
First Amendment and laches defenses.”).
190
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entertainment can itself be important news.”); Kregos v. Associated
Press, 937 F.2d 700, 704-05 (2d Cir. 1991)…
That the NBA undeniably stages and sponsors the sports events which
are the subject of legitimate news coverage does not give it a
proprietary interest in information about the event itself. The NBA’s
position that it could restrain the [New York] Times from reporting
about its games more frequently than it wishes because that privilege is
supposedly the NBA’s ‘private property’ cannot be the case any more
than that the NBA can require the [New York] Times to report on its
games in the way it chooses. Contrary to the lower court’s analysis, the
First Amendment does not condition the right to collect and
disseminate facts to the public upon a publisher’s willingness or ability
to pay for news…
Here there can be no question but that the relating of scores of NBA
basketball games are news reports. The NBA certainly considers its
games as news, and the media have traditionally considered them as
such. Key to news is the proposition that the outcome is
unknown…Unlike a play or concert to which the NBA tries to
analogize its games, there is no script; the story line does not stay the
same…[T]he outcome of NBA games is never known in advance, and
hence the results and even the running score, are archetypically
news…
In a sense, the NBA’s misconception stems from an unfounded view of
its ‘property.’ True, the NBA pays for the staging of its contents. True,
business realities appear to have influenced courts to allow sports
organizers to exploit, on an exclusive basis, the actual television (and
radio) transcriptions of the game. However, the NBA does not own, for
itself to license, the information stemming from its contests. Those
facts are news, and are not part of the proprietary ownership which the
NBA can maintain for commercial exploitation -- either during game
time or after the final buzzer has sounded…
The data, statistics, and score of an NBA game are imbued with no
more proprietary interest than any other news of the day. It is well
settled that statistics of sports events cannot by copyrighted.197
197

Brief for N. Y. Times Co. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 8–9, 14
n.6, 19, 20, NBA v. Motorola, Inc., Nos. 96-7975, 96-7983, 96-9123, (2d Cir. Sept.
23, 1996) (some internal citations omitted) (quoting American Broadcasting Cos.,
Inc. v. Cuomo, 570 F.2d 1080, 1083 (2d Cir. 1977)) (“once there is a public function,
and participation by some of the media, the First Amendment requires equal access
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Some state statutes have entertained the possibility of a ‘bubble zone’ in and
near sports stadiums to restrict betting and the dissemination of sports gaming
news and information. While the Supreme Court has upheld such a bubble zone
near a health care facility under the First Amendment,198 subsequent rulings have
called into question the permissibility of such zones moving forward.199
Lobbying has ensued regardless. In 2019, a law firm representing the “Chicago
Bears, Chicago Cubs, Chicago White Sox, and the United Center Joint Venture
(which is the home venue for the Chicago Bulls and Chicago Blackhawks)” sent
a nine-page letter to the Illinois Gaming Board and told the board that:200

Whether a zone of exclusivity is enforceable vis-à-vis the First Amendment
could be resolved if regulations in Indiana, Washington, DC, and elsewhere
focused on the “method of data collection” are litigated.201 There are other
examples too. Regulations in Iowa require licensed operators to disclose data
sources.202 In Michigan, a law includes a provision that “would bar operators
from using data that was obtained from live event attendees who are collecting
the data in violation of the event’s terms of admittance, also known as ‘scouting’

to all of the media or the rights of the First Amendment would no longer be
tenable.”).
198
Hill v. Colo., 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
199
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226, 2229 (2015); McCullen v.
Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014).
200
Letter from Donna B. More, Fox Rothschild LLP, to Marcus Fruchter, Admin.,
Ill. Gaming Bd. (Sept. 27, 2019) (on file with author).
201
Matt Carey, Recent Regulations Show
How Official Data Debate Evolving, GAMBLING COMPLIANCE (Sept. 12, 2019),
https://stage.gamblingcompliance.com/premium-content/insights_analysis/recentregulations-show-how-official-data-debate-evolving.
202
Id.
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or ‘courtsiding.’”203 The following was included in a draft New York bill:
Persons who present sporting contests shall have authority to remove
spectators and others from any facility for violation of any applicable
codes of conduct, and to deny persons access to all facilities they
control, to revoke season tickets or comparable licenses, and to share
information about such persons with others who present sporting
contests and with the appropriate jurisdictions’ law enforcement
authorities. 204
c. Piracy, Public Domain Facts, and Data(base) Rights
After the Supreme Court sports betting case was decided on May 14, 2018,
various sports leagues started using the word ‘piracy’ in lobbying efforts and
speaking points when talking to the press.205 The shift was reminiscent of how
amici National Broadcasting Company (“NBC”) described the underlying
conduct in the NBA v. Motorola litigation twenty-plus years earlier:
Appellants’ real-time, running accounts of a basketball game constitute
the on-line equivalent of a play-by-play radio broadcast that is clearly
protected under the law. A stream of detailed, real-time reports that
include the score, the time remaining and players’ fouls is a running
depiction of the game, the essence of the commercial product created
by the NBA. This is not the simple reporting of statistics or the bare
facts of a game, as appellants now strain to suggest. Appellants
provide unauthorized means of following a game in progress,
continuously and contemporaneously. This constitutes
misappropriation akin to an authorized radio play-by-play description
203

Id. (“It would further prohibit the use of scraped data obtained from ‘automated
computer programs that compile data from the internet in violation of the terms of
service of the relevant website or other internet platform.”).
204
Matt Rybaltowski, As States Consider Anti-Courtsiding Measures, Debate on
Transmission of Live Data Intensifies, SPORTS HANDLE (July 10, 2019),
https://sportshandle.com/state-anti-courtsiding-measures/.
205
Matt Rybaltowski, PGA Tour Mindful of Data Piracy Risks
as Launch of Shot-by-Shot Betting Nears, SPORTS HANDLE (Nov. 13, 2019),
https://sportshandle.com/pga-tour-data-shot-by-shot/ (In 2019, an entity calling itself
“The Sports Coalition” sent a three-page letter to the Office of the United States
Trade Representative describing how its members—a group purportedly including
MLB, NBA, NCAA, NFL, NHL, and USTA—“are heavily affected by live sports
telecast piracy, including the unauthorized live retransmission of sports telecasts over
the Internet.”); Letter from Michael J. Mellis, EVP & Gen. Couns., MLB to Sung
Chang, Dir. for Innovation & Intell. Prop., Off. of U.S. Trade Rep. (Feb. 9, 2019)
(on file with author).
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of the game delivered by a fan with a microphone at his seat, or an
unauthorized broadcast by a fan with a video camera. Appellants have
misappropriated property to which that have no rights.206
Whether information can be owned has long been analyzed.207 Whether
news can be owned has been debated and litigated for even longer. Issues related
to piracy have persisted for centuries too.208 Author Will Slauter described a
“culture of copying” in 18th century Britain and “cutting and pasting” in the
United States during the 1700s.209 Slauter provided an early example:
In 1733, a London paper called the Grub-Street Journal was accused
of ‘piracy.’ The offense? Each week’s issue contained a digest of news
compiled from eight to ten other London papers. The editor would read
these papers looking for different accounts of the same event and then
reproduce short excerpts one after the other, always indicating the
source.210
Two court rulings in the United States—one in 1918 and the other in 1921—
shaped the issue for decades later. In 1918, the Supreme Court recognized a
“quasi property” right in time-sensitive news that was untethered to copyright.211
Three years later, the Seventh Circuit concluded that formatted news articles
were eligible for copyright protection and could be infringed.212 Evolving
technology—first radio and then television—gave rise to a host of
misappropriation court cases. Researcher Victoria Smith Ekstrand tracked such
206

Brief for NBC as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff at 8, NBA v. Motorola, Inc.
(2d Cir. Oct. 3, 1996).
207
ANNE WELLS BRANSCOMB, WHO OWNS INFORMATION? FROM PRIVACY TO
PUBLIC ACCESS 174 (1994).
208
ADRIAN JOHNS, PIRACY: THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WARS FROM
GUTENBERG TO GATES 328 (2009).
209
WILL SLAUTER, WHO OWNS THE NEWS?: A HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT 51,
87 (2019).
210
Id. at 1.
211
Int’l News Serv. v. AP, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). Eleven years later, a Second
Circuit ruling cast doubt on whether a court, as opposed to Congress, could create
such a common law property right. Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279,
280 (2d Cir. 1929). For a detailed account of the Supreme Court’s INS v. AP ruling,
see VICTORIA SMITH EKSTRAND, HOT NEWS IN THE AGE OF BIG DATA: A LEGAL
HISTORY OF THE HOT NEWS DOCTRINE & IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DIGITAL
AGE (2015). For example, Ekstrand expertly reveals the origins of phrases such as
“reaping where one has not sown” and “parasite” in a 1902 Seventh Circuit case. Id.
at 56 (citing Nat’l Tel. News Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 119 F. 294, 298 (7th Cir.
1902)).
212
Chi. Record-Herald Co. v. Tribune Ass’n, 275 F. 797, 798–99 (7th Cir. 1921).
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cases and detailed special concerns when sporting events were (re-)broadcast:
In twenty-five misappropriation decisions from 1930 through 1959,
sixteen involved the piracy of radio signals or the piracy of sound
recordings or live radio performances. Plaintiffs in thirteen of those
sixteen decisions were successful making a claim of misappropriation.
These misappropriation cases typically involved the reading of printed
news from a newspaper on the air, the rebroadcast or recording of live
radio performances, and the reuse of live radio descriptions of sporting
events, such as baseball games.
The unique character of sports events—live unscripted action made
available to the public by private organizations—combined with the
new medium of radio to bring sports to many more fans. But the nature
of such events on radio also created many more opportunities for
others to use or pirate parts of the broadcast left unprotected by
copyright. Such actions infuriated private sports organization and their
owners who financed and ran such events. Most courts were
sympathetic to such misappropriation actions and in their decisions,
found it easy to apply elements of misappropriation.213
According to Ekstrand, one boxing case involved a defendant who used
“newsgathering representatives…located at vantage points outside the stadium
but within view of the bout.”214 Another lawsuit included allegations that a
defendant “obtained live reports of the games by stationing reporters at vantage
points above the walls…where the [Pittsburgh] Pirates played.”215 A third case
involved a disfavored independent sports reporter who sent out play-by-play
accounts of New York Giants baseball games.216 All three cases found that
misappropriation had occurred and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. Ekstrand
determined that Loeb v. Turner217 was “[t]he only sports broadcast decision to
reject a finding of misappropriation during this time.”218 The Loeb v. Turner
court allowed a reporter, “who was stationed outside the racecar track,”219 to
broadcast his own depiction of the race gleaned by listening to another radio
signal. The Loeb v. Turner court explained:

213
214
215
216
217
218
219

EKSTRAND, supra note 211, at 112–13, 120.
Id. at 120.
Id. at 121.
Id. at 122.
Loeb v. Turner, 257 S.W.2d 800 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
EKSTRAND, supra note 211, at 123.
Id.
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The actual happenings of each day, including sporting events, become
part of the facts of history immediately upon their happening. News of
them cannot be copyrighted; nor, so far as the public is concerned, can
the news itself become the subject of a property right belonging
exclusively to any person. To hold otherwise would be to contravene
our constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech and freedom of the
press.220
Whether sports leagues and teams playing games in publicly-owned
stadiums are state actors in the context of enforcing restrictions on the
dissemination of sports gaming news and information is unsettled. No federal or
state case has directly addressed the issue. However, the Supreme Court has
found that public funding does not automatically attach state actor classification
to a private entity,221 even if the entity is granted legal monopoly status.222
In the years immediately following the Supreme Court’s decision in Feist
Publications v. Rural Telephone Service,223 Congress considered—but never
passed—multiple bills that would provide protection for the commercial value
of information databases.224 One such bill, the Collections of Information
Antipiracy Act, H.R. 2652, 105th Congress, passed the House of Representatives
on May 19, 1998 before dying in the Senate.225 The object of the bill was, “in
effect, to provide a quasi-property right in certain collections of information that
required great effort to compile.”226 The DOJ found that the bill “would provide
what is known as ‘sweat of the brow’ protection for certain compilations of
factual material.”227
The DOJ noted multiple “constitutional concerns” stemming from the bill,
including concerns related to the Intellectual Property Clause, Commerce
Clause, and First Amendment.228 For example, the DOJ wrote that “some
language in Feist might also fairly be read to suggest…that the Intellectual
220

Loeb, 257 S.W. at 802-03.
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840 (1982).
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Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 358–59 (1974).
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Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991).
224
Samuel E. Trosow, Sui Generis Database Legislation:
A Critical Analysis, 7 YALE J.L. & TECH. 534, 573 (2004). For details on how
Congress created a sui generis property right in the context of computer chips, see
Pamela Samuelson, Creating a New Kind of Intellectual Property: Applying the
Lessons of the Chip Law to Computer Programs, 70 MINN. L. REV. 471–86 (1986).
225
Memorandum from William Treanor, Dep. Asst. Att’y Gen., to William
Marshall, Assoc. White House Counsel, on Constitutional Concerns Raised by the
Collections of Info. Antipiracy Act 166 (July 28, 1998).
226
Id.
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Id.
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Property Clause prohibits Congress from relying on any other constitutional
power to afford copyright-like protection to facts and to the nonoriginal parts of
factual compilations.”229 The DOJ also wrote: “Even if the Intellectual Property
Clause does not itself impose constraints on Congress’s Commerce Clause
Power, the First Amendment might nevertheless limit the type of protection that
Congress can provide against the ‘use’ and ‘extraction’ of factual
compilations.”230
The DOJ’s First Amendment-related concern derived from multiple
Supreme Court cases that have addressed related issues. The DOJ cited New York
Times v. Sullivan for the proposition that “[o]ne of the principal aims of the First
Amendment is to ‘secure the widest possible dissemination of information from
diverse and antagonistic sources.’”231 Further, the DOJ cited several Supreme
Court cases to emphasize that “the government may not generally restrict
individuals from disclosing information that lawfully comes into their hands in
the absence of a ‘state interest of the highest order.’”232 Finally, the DOJ looked
to Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises to highlight the so-called
idea/expression dichotomy, which “strike[s] a definitional balance between the
First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free communication of
facts while still protecting an author’s expression. No author may copyright his
ideas or the facts he narrates.”233 The DOJ concluded: “[N]o intellectual property
rights can extend to facts that have been released in the public domain.”234
d. Misappropriation and Intellectual Property Preemption
With some exceptions, intellectual property protection generally includes
four categories—patents, trademarks, copyrights, and trade secrets. The divide
between ‘ideas’ and ‘expression’ permeates across intellectual property
categories. The Supreme Court found that “‘[d]ue to this [idea/expression]
distinction, every idea, theory, and fact in a copyrighted work becomes instantly
available for public exploitation at the moment of publication’; the author’s
expression alone gains copyright protection.”235 Facts—such as phone numbers
or perhaps the score of a basketball game as the game is being played—are
almost certainly not eligible for intellectual property protection.
Indeed, the most prominent Supreme Court case to date—Feist Publications
229

Id. at 178.
Id. at 186.
231
Id. (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964)).
232
Id. at 187 (citing United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 605 (1995)).
233
Id. at 188 (alteration in original) (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985)).
234
Id.
235
Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 890 (2012) (quoting Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
U.S. 186, 219 (2003)).
230

Fall 2020]

REGULATING SPORTS GAMING DATA

57

v. Rural Telephone Services—considered whether phone numbers qualified for
copyright protection.236 In a 9-0 ruling, the Supreme Court concluded that “[t]he
primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but ‘to
promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts.237’” The Court also made
clear that “[o]riginality is a constitutional requirement”238 and copyright
protection only attaches if there is some “minimal level of creativity.”239 Further,
the Court rejected the so-called ‘sweat of the brow’ theory involving
compilations of fact-based news.240 In an explanation particularly relevant to
sports gaming news and information, the Court also explained how facts should
be positioned:
[F]acts do not owe their origin to an act of authorship. The
distinction is one between creation and discovery: The first person to
find and report a particular fact has not created the fact; he or she has
merely discovered its existence…The same is true of all facts—
scientific, historical, biographical, and news of the day. ‘[T]hey may
not be copyrighted and are part of the public domain available to every
person.’241
Disputes over distribution rights outside the context of sports gaming data
have persisted for over 130 years, with a range of precedent that has resulted in
somewhat of a split between the Second Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit.242 The
Eighth Circuit also has a plausible intra-circuit split of authority.243 Rights
attached to news and information relevant in the sports gaming realm also arose
236

Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991).
Id. at 349 (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 154
n.2 (1975)). Whether modern highly commercialized sports qualify as ‘useful Arts’
under the Constitution is an issue outside the scope of this paper, but worthy of
further inquiry.
238
Id. at 346.
239
Id. at 358.
240
Id. at 352–54, 359–60 (“originality, not ‘sweat of the brow,’ is the touchstone of
copyright protection in fact-based works”). The ‘sweat of the brow’ theory is also
sometimes referred to as ‘industrious collection.’ For details, see Craig Joyce & Tyler
T. Ochoa, Reach Out and Touch Someone: Reflections on the 25th Anniversary of
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 54(2) HOUSTON L. REV. 257
(2016).
241
Feist Publ’ns, 499 U.S. at 347–48 (citing Miller v. Universal Studios, 650 F.2d
1365, 1369 (5th Cir. 1981)).
242
Morris Commc’n Corp. v. PGA Tour, Inc., 364 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2004); NBA
v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997).
243
C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P.,
505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007); NFL v. McBee & Bruno's, Inc., 792 F.2d 726 (8th Cir.
1986).
237
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in a district court decision within the jurisdiction of the Third Circuit.244 A litany
of other cases date back to the late 1800s.245 However, since the Supreme Court
rejected the concept of federal common law in its 1938 Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins ruling,246 it generally falls to state common law to recognize a cause
of action like misappropriation.247
To date, courts have been unwilling to deem information—sports gamingrelated or otherwise—as intellectual property worthy of commercial
protection.248 Indeed, “[a] fundamental principle of intellectual property is that
no one should be given a monopoly on facts, ideas, or other building blocks of
knowledge, thought, or communication.”249 Nevertheless, sports leagues and
others have persisted in positing that a property right of sorts can attach to news
emanating from the underlying games or contests. For example, in the early
stages of the recent Supreme Court sports betting litigation, the DOJ took the
position that PASPA granted sports leagues a quasi-property right. According to
the DOJ:
PASPA does give the leagues a protected legal interest that has been
invaded by New Jersey’s authorization of sports gambling…the legal
protection that PASPA accords to sports leagues is similar to the
protections traditionally afforded in fields such as copyright and

244

NFL v. Governor of Del., 435 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Del. 1977).
Kregos v. Associated Press, 3 F.3d 656 (2d Cir. 1993); United States Golf Ass’n
v. St. Andrews Sys., Data-Max, Inc., 749 F.2d 1028 (3d Cir. 1984); Baltimore
Orioles v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1986);
Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broad. Co., 24 F. Supp. 490, 492 (W.D. Penn. 1938)
(“[T]he plaintiffs and the defendant are using baseball news as material for
profit…by reason of its creation of the game, its control of the park, and its restriction
of the dissemination of news therefrom, [the Pittsburgh Athletic Company] has a
property right in such news, and the right to control the use thereof for a reasonable
time following the games”); Twentieth Century Sporting Club, Inc. v. Transradio
Press Serv., Inc., 300 N.Y.S. 159, 165 Misc. 71 (1937); Detroit Base-Ball v. Deppert,
27 N.W. 856 (Mich. 1886).
246
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 70 (1938).
247
The continued vitality of state misappropriation laws was addressed by the
Supreme Court in Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1971). Federal copyright
laws were updated in 1976. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102–103, 301 (2018).
248
Raymond T. Nimmer & Patricia A. Krauthaus, Information as a Commodity:
New Imperatives of Commercial Law, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103, 129 (1992).
249
Julie E. Cohen & William M. Martin, Intellectual Property Rights in Data, in
INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 45, 51 (Deanna J. Richards, Braden
R. Allenby, & W. Dale Compton, eds., 2001).
245
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trademark law, where authors and companies are given the right not to
have their creative works exploited by other parties.250
Legal claims alleging misappropriation (or free-riding) typically arise when
the plaintiff recognizes—explicitly or implicitly—that no intellectual property
right exists.251 Also, misappropriation claims usually arise when two parties are
in competition with each other and one is claiming theft of an intangible.252
Although not narrowly focused on sports gaming data, there are three relatively
recent federal appellate-level rulings that speak to legal claims centered on the
commodification of real-time news and information.253 Taken together, the
trilogy of cases254 provides a framework for evaluating misappropriation claims
involving real-time sports gaming data.255
250

Brief for Appellee at 17–22, NCAA v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir.
2013).
251
Michael E. Kenneally, Misappropriation and the Morality of Free-Riding, 19
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 289 (2014).
252
For a detailed discussion about whether the “misappropriation doctrine, if it is to
be retained at all, should be federalized,” see Richard A. Posner, Misappropriation:
A Dirge, 40(3) HOUSTON L. REV. 621, 640 (2003); see also Edmund J. Sease,
Misappropriation is Seventy-Five Years Old: Should We Bury It or Revive It?, 70
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 781, 781 (1994).
253
In 2016, a district court judge in New York ruled against an event organizer who
tried to restrict the dissemination of real-time chess moves. World Chess US, Inc. v.
ChessGames Services LLC, No. 1:16-cv-08629-VM, 2016 WL 7190075, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2016).
254
Morris Commc’n Corp. v. PGA Tour, Inc., 364 F.3d 1288, 1293 (11th Cir. 2004);
NBA v. Motorola, 105 F.3d 841, 849 (2d Cir. 1997); C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc.
v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007). Two
dated cases— Nat’l Football League v. Governor of Del., 435 F.Supp 1372 (D. Del.
1977) United States Golf Ass’n v. St. Andrews Sys., Data-Max, Inc., 749 F.2d 1028
(3d Cir. 1984)—also provide insight on the viability of misappropriation claims in
the sports industry. In NFL v. Delaware, the court rejected the NFL’s
misappropriation claim (among others) and found that gambling on NFL games “has
not injured [plaintiffs].” 435 F.Supp. at 1378. In the golf case, the Third Circuit keyed
in on the lack of direct competition between the parties: “Indirect competition of this
sort—use of information in competition with the creator outside of its primary
market—falls outside the scope of the misappropriation doctrine, since the public
interest in providing an additional incentive to the creator or gatherer of information.”
749 F.2d at 1038.
255
Soothsayer-worthy scholars have forecasted the importance of real-time sports
data. See Louis Klein, National Basketball Association v. Motorola, Inc.: Future
Prospects for Protecting Real-Time Information, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 585 (1998). See
also Gary R. Roberts, The Scope of the Exclusive Right to Control Dissemination of
Real-Time Sports Event Information, 15 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 167, 186-87 (2004)
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First, in NBA v. Motorola, the Second Circuit ruled against the NBA in a
‘hot news’ misappropriation case involving a mobile pager system created by
Motorola and STATS that tracked in-game statistics such as the score and time
remaining.256 The appellate court held “that a narrow ‘hot news’ exception does
survive preemption. However, we also hold that appellants’ transmission of
‘real-time’ NBA game scores and information tabulated from television and
radio broadcasts of games in progress does not constitute misappropriation of
‘hot news’ that is the property of the NBA.”257 To survive preemption by federal
copyright law, the Second Circuit offered a test with five requirements that the
court concluded the NBA did not meet:
(i) a plaintiff generates or gathers information at a cost; (ii) the
information is time-sensitive; (iii) a defendant’s use of the information
constitutes free-riding on the plaintiff’s efforts; (iv) the defendant is in
direct competition with a product or service offered by the plaintiffs;
and (v) the ability of other parties to free-ride on the efforts of the
plaintiff or others would so reduce the incentive to produce the product
or service that its existence or quality would be substantially
threatened.258
In the course of the litigation, the NBA argued that it “has adopted certain
limitations with respect to reporting on NBA games in progress in order to
‘preserve the value of its proprietary interests’ in real-time NBA game
information.”259 The NBA also wrote that “restrictions on the use of real-time
NBA game information also apply to ticket holders, who are prohibited from
(“The question here is whether there is a[n]…overriding justification with respect to
rights of sports event promoters to control the information about their events. It
appears that except in the case of a promoter that can prove that a ‘hot news’ situation
exists, there is not such an overriding public interest…Once the promoter can profit
sufficiently from expending the effort and resources to produce, market, and sell its
sports entertainment product, there appears to be no public benefit from allowing the
promoter to use the legal system offensively to reap competitive profits by restricting
the flow of information the public wants…Only statistical data specifically compiled
by the promoter about a sports event that is broadcast live will remain within the
promoter’s exclusive commercial control. That is no doubt far less than most sports
leagues and governing bodies would like.”)
256
NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 843–44 (2d Cir. 1997).
257
Id. at 843.
258
Id. at 845. In a footnote, the Second Circuit explained that it did not reach any
conclusion on the First Amendment and laches defenses raised by Motorola and
STATS. Id. at 854 n. 10.
259
Brief of Appellees-Cross-Appellants the National Basketball
Association and NBA Properties, Inc. at 7, NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d
Cir. 1997)(No.96-7975)( (on file with author).
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transmitting any information, descriptions, or accounts of games in progress.”260
The NBA explained that: “[T]he issue here is not whether the public will receive
access to real-time NBA game information, but only whether defendants are
entitled to profit from what they have neither created nor paid for.”261 Via an
amicus brief, the NBA received support from the NFL, MLB, and NHL, with the
trio explaining that they “share a common interest with the NBA in protecting
and preserving for professional sports leagues and their member clubs, the rights
to, and commercial value of, exclusive presentation of real-time running
accounts of the live professional sporting events that result from their efforts and
investments.”262
The NBA v. Motorola case saw considerable amici activity focused on
misappropriation and the preemption issue. The Chicago Mercantile Exchange
(“CME”) filed an amicus brief in support of the NBA.263 According to the CME:
Section 301 of the Copyright Act of 1976 indisputably preempts some
types of state law misappropriation claims. It does not preempt,
however, all state law claims of misappropriation of information.
Section 301 imposes two distinct requirements, both of which must be
satisfied for preemption: that the state rights are ‘equivalent’ to the
rights within the general scope of copyright, and that the claim
involves ‘works of authorship.’ In many misappropriation cases,
including those involving taking of real-time quotations from financial
exchanges, there is no preemption because the misappropriated
information does not constitute a work of authorship…As the Seventh
Circuit has explained, where the writings at issue are ‘a mere notation
of figures at which stocks or cereals have sold, or of the result of a
horse-race, or baseball game, they cannot be said to bear the impress of
originality, and fail, therefor to rise to the plane of authorship.’264
“State law claims alleging misappropriation of such quotations, sports
scores, and like notations are therefore not preempted by the Copyright
Act.”265
260

Id. at 7 n.4.
Id. at 38.
262
Brief for the National Football League, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting the
National Basketball Association and NBA Properties, Inc. at 9, NBA v. Motorola,
Inc., 105 F.3d 841(2d Cir.1997) (No.96-7975) (on file with author).
263
Brief of Amicus Curiae Chicago Mercantile Exchange in Support of Appellees
National Basketball Association, and NBA Properties, Inc., NBA v. Motorola, Inc.
at 298, 105 F.3d 841 (2d. Cir 1997) (No. 96-7975) (on file with author).
264
Nat’l. Tel. News Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 119 F. 294, 298 (7th Cir. 1902)
(“Without the use of [Western Union’s] tape, [National Telegraph] would have
nothing to distribute. The parasite that killed, would itself be killed, and the public
would be left without any service at any price.”).
265
Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 263, at 3–4 (some internal citations omitted).
261
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Fourteen years after NBA v. Motorola, the Second Circuit considered another
‘hot news’ case and suggested that NBA v. Motorola’s five-part test could be
considered dicta.266 Nevertheless, allegations of ‘hot news’ misappropriation
continue to be furthered in court. As of June 20, 2020, the most prominent ongoing case involved one news outlet (The Capitol Forum) suing another
(Bloomberg) in connection with subscription-based financial information and
whether the hot news misappropriation doctrine is recognized in the District of
Columbia.267 According to researcher Victoria Smith Ekstrand, “the hot news
doctrine is part of state common law” in Alaska, California, Colorado, Delaware,
Illinois, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, and Wisconsin.268 Another researcher
concurred about the legal status of these fourteen states.269
Issues pertaining to preemption are particularly germane if a federal court
sitting in diversity involves a hot news claim that is recognized under state
common law. CME’s amicus brief in the NBA v. Motorola litigation addressed
this topic too: “Congress did not wish to displace state laws which afford a
remedy for misappropriation of hot news, whether in the traditional mode of
International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918), or in the
news form of data updates from scientific, business or financial data bases.”270
The NBA pointed to the legislative history too: “[S]tate law should have the
flexibility to afford a remedy…against a consistent pattern of unauthorized
appropriation by a competitor of the facts…constituting ‘hot’ news.”271 The
NBA told the Second Circuit that Congress was reminded of this in testimony:
266

Barclays Capital, Inc. v. TheFlyOnTheWall.com, Inc. 650 F.3d 876, 907 (2d Cir.
2011). The Second Circuit issued another ‘hot news’ ruling the following year. See
Forest Park Pictures v. Universal Television Network, Inc., 683 F.3d 424, 430-31
(2d Cir. 2012) (preemption turns on whether the plaintiff shows “time-sensitive
factual information, free-riding by the defendant, and a threat to the very existence
of the plaintiff’s product”).
267
DBW Partners, LLC v. Bloomberg, L.P., No. 1:19-cv-3715-RBW (D.D.C. 2020).
268
VICTORIA SMITH EKSTRAND, HOT NEWS IN THE AGE OF BIG DATA: A LEGAL
HISTORY OF THE HOT NEWS DOCTRINE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DIGITAL AGE 15
n.45 (2015).
269
Edmund J. Sease, Misappropriation is Seventy-Five Years Old: Should We Bury
it or Revive it?, 70 N.D L. REV. 781, 801-02 (1994).
270
Brief of Amicus Curiae Chicago Mercantile Exchange in Support of Appellees
National Basketball Association and NBA Properties at 5, Inc., NBA v. Motorola,
Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d. Cir 1997) (No. 96-7975) (on file with author) (citing H.R.
Rep. No. 94-1476, quoted in Financial Info., Inc. v. Moody’s Inv’rs. Serv., Inc., 808
F.2d 204, 208 (2d Cir. 1986).
271
Petition for Rehearing with Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc of the [NBA] and
NBA Properties, Inc. at 11, NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d. Cir 1997)
(No.96-7975) (on file with author).

Fall 2020]

REGULATING SPORTS GAMING DATA

63

Indeed, Congress was specifically apprised of the existence of this
state law protection in testimony by representatives of professional
sports leagues. See testimony of Philip R. Hochberg on behalf of
National Hockey League, Hearings Before House Judiciary Committee
on H.R. 2223 Copyright Law Revision, June 12, 1975 at 815 (noting
that extending copyright protection to live broadcasts of sporting
Events would leave unaffected existing state law protection for ‘unfair
competition where there was a radio pickup of a live broadcast of a
game in the Pittsburgh Athletic Club case’); id. at 803 (testimony of
Bowie Kuhn, Commissioner of Baseball, referring to existing
protection under INS).272
The on-going ‘hot news’ case involving The Capitol Forum and Bloomberg
provides a case study about how Motorola and other precedent are currently
positioned.273 In a January 2020 court filing, Bloomberg repeatedly cited Feist
and emphasized that “raw facts may be copied at will”274 and “[t]hat there can
be no valid copyright in facts is universally understood.”275 Bloomberg also
keyed in on how timely newsgathering is protected by the First Amendment: “the
press may not be punished for ‘lawfully obtain[ing] truthful information about a
matter of public significance’”276 given that “‘speech on public issues occupies
the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values and is entitled to
special protection.’”277 Finally, Bloomberg flagged potential “chilling effects”
that could result if any rule were adopted that would strip away “‘protection for
seeking out the news.’”278
In a sub-section devoted to arguing that the ‘hot news’ misappropriation tort
runs counter to the Constitution’s Intellectual Property Clause, Bloomberg also
posited that “the freedom to use facts—even to ‘free-ride’ on facts gathered
through the effort of others—is constitutionally protected.”279 According to
Bloomberg, post-Feist precedent has “repeatedly confirmed that facts must

272

Id. at 11–12, n.8.
DBW Partners, LLC v. Bloomberg, L.P., No. 1:19-cv-3715-RBW (D.D.C. 2020).
274
Defendants Bloomberg L.P.’s and Bloomberg Finance L.P.’s Memorandum of
Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 8, DBW Partners, LLC v. Bloomberg, No.:
1:19-cv-3715-RBW (D.D.C. 2020 Jan. 30, 2020) (citing Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural
Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991)).
275
Id. at 9 (citing Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 344 (1991)).
276
Id. at 10 (citing Smith v. Daily Mail Pub. Co., Inc., 443 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1979)).
277
Id. (citing Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011)).
278
Id. (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972)).
279
Id. at 17.
273
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remain in the public domain, free from any restraint or encumbrance.”280 In
support, Bloomberg cited to N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v.
IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., finding that “all facts—scientific, historical
biographical, and news of the day…may not be copyrighted and are part of the
public domain available to every person.”281 Likewise, Bloomberg cited Sparaco
v. Lawler, Matusky, Skelly, Eng’rs LLP for the finding that “historical, scientific,
or factual information belongs in the public domain.”282 Such precedent—
according to Bloomberg—means “[t]he Copyright Clause leaves facts in the
public domain for all to use freely, precluding any claim of a property right in
those facts.”283
Bloomberg also looked to public policy concerns when urging the district
court to reject the plaintiff’s ‘hot news’ misappropriation claim.284 First,
Bloomberg claimed that “[t]he tort of ‘hot news’ misappropriation…would grant
the original news outlet a temporary monopoly over…facts—an outcome that is
inconsistent with the strong public interest in receiving important, timely
news.”285 In support, Bloomberg cited Houchins v. KQED, Inc. and the Supreme
Court’s recognition that the “right of the public to receive such information and
ideas as [they] are published.”286 Second, Bloomberg noted “timidity and selfcensorship” concerns flagged in Bartnicki v. Vopper287 when arguing that
“recognition of the [‘hot news’] tort would chill the lawful dissemination of
important news by fostering uncertainty among news outlets as to how long they
must ‘sit’ on a story.”288
Second, the Eleventh Circuit decided an antitrust case in favor of the PGA
Tour involving a media outlet claiming the golf tour monopolized the market for
real-time news about on-going tournaments.289 The PGA Tour—as the
defendant—argued that the plaintiff was “free riding” on its own live scoring
system, which the court concluded “constitutes a legitimate pro-competitive
280

Defendants Bloomberg L.P.’s and Bloomberg Finance L.P.’s Memorandum of
Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 17, DBW Partners, LLC v. Bloomberg, No.:
1:19-cv-3715-RBW (D.D.C. 2020 Jan. 30, 2020).
281
Id. (citing N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., 497
F.3d 109, 114 (2d Cir. 2007)).
282
Id. (citing Sparaco v. Lawler, Matusky, Skelly, Eng’rs LLP, 303 F.3d 460, 46667 (2d Cir. 2002)).
283
Id. at 17-18.
284
Id. at 18.
285
Defendants Bloomberg L.P.’s and Bloomberg Finance L.P.’s Memorandum of
Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 18, DBW Partners, LLC v. Bloomberg, No.:
1:19-cv-3715-RBW (D.D.C. 2020 Jan. 30, 2020).
286
Id. (citing Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 29 n. 17 (1978)).
287
Id. (citing Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 534 n. 22 (2001)).
288
Id.
289
Morris Commc’n Corp. v. PGA Tour, Inc., 364 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2004).
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reason for imposing a restriction [on plaintiff Morris].”290 With the plaintiff only
litigating the case on antitrust grounds, the Eleventh Circuit made clear the
narrow focus of the case: “Before discussing the antitrust issues in this case, it is
important to note what this case is not about. Contrary to the arguments of Morris
and its amici curiae, this case is not about copyright law, the Constitution, the
First Amendment, or freedom of the press in news reporting.”291 In its briefing
at the district court level, the PGA Tour focused on property-related issues:
Morris and the amici completely misunderstand the district court’s
decision. The district court’s decision that PGA Tour has a protectable
property interest in the product of its proprietary scoring system is
predicated entirely on its determination that PGA Tour controls the
right of access to its private events. And having complete control over
access to its private events, PGA Tour also has the right to control
access to the information occurring within its private events, at least
until that information is publicly disseminated beyond the confines of
those events.292
Third, the Eighth Circuit considered a claim by a fantasy sports operator
against MLB’s media arm trying “to establish its right to use, without license,
the names of and information about [MLB] players in connection with its fantasy
baseball products.”293 In balancing right of publicity claims with the First
Amendment, the court found that the latter controlled.294 Indeed, the Eighth
Circuit wrote: “[R]ecitation and discussion of factual data concerning the athletic
performance of [players on MLB’s website] command a substantial public
interest, and, therefore, is a form of expression due substantial constitutional
protection.”295 The court also elaborated on how entertainment-related speech
qualifies for protection under the First Amendment:
[T]he information used in CBC’s fantasy baseball games is all readily
available in the public domain, and it would be strange law that a
person would not have a First Amendment right to use information that
is available to everyone. It is true that CBC’s use of the information is
to provide entertainment, but “speech that entertains, like speech that
informs, is protected by the First Amendment because ‘[t]he line
290

Id. at 1296.
Id. at 1292-93.
292
Brief of Appellee at 34, Morris Commc’ns Corp. v. PGA Tour, Inc., Nos. 0310226-C, 03-11503-CC (M.D. Fla. June 12, 2003).
293
C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505
F.3d 818, 820 (8th Cir. 2007).
294
Id. at 823.
295
Id. at 823-24.
291
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between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the
protection of that basic right.’”296
Supreme Court precedent has identified three types of preemption: conflict
preemption, express preemption, and field preemption.297 All three types “work
in the same way: Congress enacts a law that imposes restrictions or confers rights
on private actors; a state law confers rights or imposes restrictions that conflict
with the federal law; and therefore the federal takes precedence and the state law
is preempted.”298 The year 1964 marked the start of contemporary Supreme
Court rulings involving preemption and intellectual property.299 In two
companion patent cases—Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.300 and Compco
Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.301—the Supreme Court found preemption to
apply: “To allow a State by use of its law of unfair competition to prevent the
copying of an article which represents too slight an advance to be
patented…would be too great an encroachment on the federal patent system to
be tolerated.”302
Preemption issues vis-à-vis copyright reached the Supreme Court nine years
later in Goldstein v. California.303 There, the Court found that “[a]lthough the
Copyright Clause…recognizes the potential benefits of a national system, it does
not indicate that all writings are of national interest or that state legislation is, in
all cases, unnecessary or precluded.”304 The Supreme Court tackled preemption
and state-level trade secret laws in 1974, finding that federal patent laws did not
preempt Ohio’s trade secrecy statute.305 In 1979, the Supreme Court similarly
concluded that federal patent laws did not preempt state contract law.306 Finally,
296

Id. at 823 (citing Cardtoons v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d
959, 969 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948)).
297
Gov. Murphy v. Nat’l. Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1480 (2018)
(citing English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990)).
298
Id.
299
Potential preemption of state-level statutes in the areas of intellectual property,
misappropriation/piracy, or unfair competition could be found via the Constitution’s
Intellectual Property Clause or federal statutes. See generally Thomas B. Nachbar,
Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms, 104(2) COLUM. L. REV. 272, 358-61
(2004) (discussing the so-called “dormant Intellectual Property Clause”).
300
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
301
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
302
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. at 231-32 (1964).
303
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 548 (1973) (case involved a California law
“making it a criminal offense to ‘pirate’ recordings produced by others”).
304
Id. at 556-57.
305
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 470 (1974).
306
Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (“The states are
free to regulate the use of such intellectual property in any manner not inconsistent
with federal law”).
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in 1989, the Supreme Court cited the Intellectual Property Clause and determined
that a Florida law restricting duplication of boat designs was preempted by
federal patent laws.307 According to the Supreme Court:
Thus our past decisions have made clear that state regulation of
intellectual property must yield to the extent that it clashes with the
balance struck by Congress in our patent laws…Our decisions since
Sears and Compco have made it clear that the [Intellectual Property
Clause] do[es] not, by [its] own force or by negative implication,
deprive the States of the power to adopt rules for the promotion of
intellectual creation within their own jurisdictions. Thus, where
‘Congress determines that neither federal protection nor freedom from
restraint is required by the national interest,’ the States remain free to
promote originality and creativity in their own domains.308
In 1996, the Seventh Circuit added a twist to copyright preemption issues by
intertwining a contract rights analysis in ProCD v. Zeidenberg.309 The case
involved a digital compilation of numbers in a telephone directory, largely the
same type of information deemed uncopyrightable by the Supreme Court in
Feist. The Seventh Circuit upheld the no-copying protections in a so-called
‘shrinkwrap license,’ rationalizing that “[a] copyright is a right against the world.
Contracts, by contrast, generally affect only their parties, strangers may do as
they please, so contracts do not create ‘exclusive rights.’”310 Professor Jane
Ginsburg summarized: “[U]nder prevailing copyright preemption caselaw, a
contract forbidding copying is not equivalent to a right under copyright, nor does
it per se violate copyright public policy.”311 Sports leagues looking to monetize
sports gaming data will likely turn to ProCD for support when arguing to expand
non-copyright rights via licensing and otherwise.
States—like Tennessee, Illinois, and Michigan—that try to grant de facto
property rights in the context of sports gaming data are vulnerable to federal
preemption. With no on-point precedent finding such a property right, any
litigant challenging the ‘official data’ laws on constitutional grounds will almost
307

Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 152-165 (1989)
(“The law of unfair competition has its roots in the common-law tort of deceit: its
general concern is with protecting consumers from confusion as to source. While that
concern may result in the creation of ‘quasi-property rights’ in communicative
symbols, the focus is on the protection of consumers, not the protection of producers
as an incentive to product innovation.”).
308
Id. at 152, 165. (internal citations omitted).
309
See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
310
Id. at 1454.
311
Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright, Common Law, and Sui Generis Protection of
Databases in the United States and Abroad, 66 CIN. L. REV. 151, 166 (1997).
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certainly look to the interplay between the Intellectual Property Clause and state
laws that arguably run counter to the Constitution’s limitations. Such an
argument would be the strongest if any state positioned its law on
misappropriation grounds.
D. State
Dozens of states have accepted the Supreme Court’s invitation to regulate
sports gaming in the absence of direct federal oversight.312 As state legislatures
deliberated, numerous sports leagues—including a majority of the leagues who
initiated and then lost the Supreme Court case—took to lobbying.313 One of the
most common league lobbying objectives was to secure a statutory mandate
requiring licensed operators to purchase news, information, and data from the
sports leagues or the leagues’ designee(s).314
Prior to the litigation that eventually made its way to the Supreme Court,
some of the same sports leagues now lobbying previously sued different states
on issues pertaining to sports gaming.315 In 1976, the NFL and all of its member
teams sued the Governor of Delaware over the state’s plans to offer a footballrelated lottery.316 In 1989, the NBA sued Oregon when the state’s lottery
launched a betting contest connected to basketball scores.317 Twenty years later,
all five of the sports leagues who lost the Supreme Court case against New Jersey
prevailed in PASPA-driven litigation against Delaware after the state moved to
permit single-game wagering.318

312

See Ryan Rodenberg, Over a Third of the U.S. Can Legally Bet on Sports: Here’s
an Updated Map, ESPN (May 14, 2020), https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/
29170044/over-third-us-legally-bet-sports-here-updated-map.
313
Ryan Rodenberg, Due Process, Private Nondelegation Doctrine,
and the Regulation of Sports Betting, 9 UNLV GAMING L. J. 99, 116 (2019).
314
Id.
315
If the sports league quintet were to sue certain states again—such as Delaware or
New Jersey—there is a possibility that a res judicata issue could arise. Res judicata
is a “a term that now comprises two distinct doctrines regarding the preclusive effect
of prior litigation” and encompasses two doctrines—issue preclusion (“which
precludes a party from relitigating an issue actually decided in a prior case and
necessary to the judgment”) and claim preclusion (which “prevents parties from
raising issues that could have been raised and decided in a prior action—even if they
were not actually litigated”). Lucky Brand Dungarees, Inc., et al. v. Marcel Fashions
Group, 140 S. Ct. 1589, 1594-95 (2020).
316
Nat’l Football League v. Governor of Del., 435 F.Supp. 1372 (D. Del. 1977).
317
NBA Files Suit Against Oregon Lottery, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1989, at C2.
318
Office of the Comm’r of Baseball v. Markell, 579 F.3d 293, 293 (3d Cir. 2009).
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1. ‘Commercially Reasonable’ Standard
As of June 20, 2020, three states (Tennessee, Illinois, and Michigan) have
enacted laws mandating the use of so-called ‘official data’ for certain types of
wagers.319 Over a dozen other states have introduced bills that contained similar
provisions. Such moves have resulted after considerable lobbying from sports
leagues. Lobbyists have also sometimes proposed a ‘commercially reasonable”
standard to which the ‘official data’ mandates should be measured. According to
one report, the commercially reasonable standard in Illinois would be based on:
The availability of an official league data feed from two or more
vendors designated by the sports governing body, the use of such a
data feed by another master sports wagering licensee in Illinois, or the
use of such data feed by two or more sports wagering operators in
other legal markets, shall be sufficient by not necessary to establish
that the official league data is available on commercially reasonable
terms.320
In the first iteration of rulemaking, Michigan considered four factors in its
determination whether pricing is ‘commercially reasonable’: (i) the availability
of official data to sports betting operators from more than one source; (ii) market
information regarding the purchase by operators of data from any authorized
source including sports governing bodies or their designees for the purpose of
settling sports wagers, for use in this state or other jurisdictions; (iii) the quantity,
quality and complexity of the process that is used for collecting the data; and (iv)
the extent to which sports governing bodies or their designees have made data
used to settle tier 2 sports bets available to operators.321
The second version of rulemaking in Michigan included six factors to
determine ‘commercially reasonable’ pricing: (i) whether the data is available
from more than one authorized source under materially different terms; (ii)
market information regarding the purchase of data used to settle Tier 2 sports
bets in Michigan or any other jurisdiction; (iii) characteristics of official league
319

Rodenberg, supra note 312. The effective date of the new sports gaming law in
Virginia—another jurisdiction with a statutory mandate pertaining to ‘official
data’—is July 1, 2020. Whether all or some of the new state laws attaching to sports
gaming data run counter to the dormant Commerce Clause remains an open question.
320
Matt Carey, Leagues Propose Low Bar for Official Data ‘Commercially
Reasonable’ Restriction, GAMBLING COMPLIANCE, (Oct. 8, 2019), https://gambling
compliance.com/premium-content/insights_analysis/leagues-propose-low-barofficial-data-commercially-reasonable.
321
John Holden, What Exactly is ‘Commercially Reasonable” Pricing for Official
League Data? LEGAL SPORTS REP., (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.legalsportsreport.
com/36742/commercially-reasonable-official-league-data-sports-betting/.
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data and alternate data sources regarding the nature, quantity, quality, integrity,
completeness, accuracy, reliability, availability, and timeliness of the data; (iv)
the extent to which sports governing bodies or their designees have made data
used to settle Tier 2 bets available; (v) the availability and cost of comparable
data from other sources; (vi) whether any terms of the contract or offer sheet are
uncompetitive in nature, economically unfeasible, or place an undue burden on
the operator.322
Tennessee’s new sports betting law—which included an ‘official data’
mandate substantially similar to that found in Illinois, and Michigan—states “[a]
licensee shall exclusively use official league data for purposes of live
betting…”323 The phrase “official league data” was defined as:
statistics, results, outcomes, and other data related to a sporting event
obtained pursuant to an agreement with the relevant governing body of
a sport or sports league, organization, or association whose corporate
headquarters are based in the United States, or an entity expressly
authorized by such governing body to provide such information to
licensees for purposes of live betting…324
Tennessee also created a nine-person Sports Wagering Advisory Council.
Of the nine members, three are selected by the House speaker, three by the
lieutenant governor, and three by the governor.325 As of March 1, 2020, eight of
the nine positions had been filled. One of the governor’s appointees is Billy
Orgel, who reportedly has a small ownership stake in the NBA’s Memphis
Grizzlies team.326 One of the lieutenant governor’s appointees is Kandace
Stewart, a lawyer and team executive with the Memphis Grizzlies.327
Even after the law was enacted, Tennessee continued to tinker with the
statute. In March 2020, the state held hearings to consider whether to amend the
law in order to grant more power to the state’s Sports Wagering Advisory
Council.328 For example, the amended law would have delegated to the Sports
322

Matthew Kredell, Michigan Sports Betting Draft Rules Show Path to Challenge
Official League Data, LEGAL SPORTS REP., (April 30, 2020), https://www.legalsports
report.com/40454/michigan-sports-betting-draft-rules/.
323
Tennessee Sports Gaming Act, § 4-51-316 (2019).
324
Tennessee Sports Gaming Act, § 4-51-302(17) (2019).
325
Jessica Welman, Who is on Tennessee’s Sports Betting Advisory Council?,
PLAYTENN, Mar. 2, 2020, https://www.playtenn.com/who-is-on-tennessees-sportsbetting-advisory-council/.
326
Id.
327
Id.
328
See Brian Pempus, New Tennessee Sports Betting
Bill Would Change Some Duties of Advisory Council, TNBETS (Feb. 5, 2020),
https://www.tnbets.com/tennessee-sports-betting-council-bill; see also
Matt Rybaltowski, Tennessee House Tables Sports Betting Bill Amid Debate Over

Fall 2020]

REGULATING SPORTS GAMING DATA

71

Wagering Advisory Council the ability “to enforce this part and supervise
compliance with laws relating to the regulation and control of wagering on
sporting events in this state.”329 In addition, Tennessee’s lieutenant governor and
house speaker jointly wrote a letter that stated, in relevant part: “There have been
concerns brought to our attention that some of the rules, as drafted, may be
outside the authority given to the Board or Council pursuant to the ‘Tennessee
Sports Gaming Act.’”330 Such letter implicitly raised concerns over the
permissibility of delegation. More broadly, the off-loading of regulatory
oversight to industry-tethered metrics and boards comprised of industry
members, raises the spectre of invalidation via the nondelegation doctrine.
2. Nondelegation Doctrine
To the extent that some states fully or partially delegate regulatory oversight
of sports betting data to private entities—through establishment of
‘commercially reasonably’ prices or playing a role in the determination thereof—
there are constraints that may apply. At the federal level, such constraints derive
from the private nondelegation doctrine (via the Vesting Clauses) and the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.331 Among a majority of states, there is also a

Controversial Rule, SPORTS HANDLE (March 10, 2020), https://sportshandle.com/
tennessee-sports-betting-rules-regs-changes; see also Jessica Welman, Tennessee
Lawmakers Considering Change in Leadership on Sports Betting, PLAYTENN (Feb.
24, 2020), https://www.playtenn.com/tn-sports-betting-possible-leadership-change/.
329
Brian Pempus, New Tennessee Sports Betting Bill Would Change Some Duties of
Advisory Council, TNBETS (Feb. 5, 2020), https://www.tnbets.com/tennesseesports-betting-council-bill.
330
Erik Schelzig, Speakers Seek Delay of Sports Gambling in Tennessee Amid
Questions About Draft Rules, TNJ: ON THE HILL (February 18, 2020),
https://onthehill.tnjournal.net/speakers-seek-delay-of-rules-for-sports-gambling-intennessee.
331
Ryan M. Rodenberg, Due Process, Private Nondelegation Doctrine, and the
Regulation of Sports Betting, 9(1) UNLV GAMING L. J. 99 (2019); At the federal
level, the private nondelegation doctrine traces its roots back to Carter v. Carter Coal,
298 U.S. 238 (1936). Both Justice Thomas and Justice Alito—in separate
concurrences—recently cited Carter Coal when describing the contours of the
private nondelegation doctrine. According to Justice Thomas: “the ‘private
nondelegation doctrine’ is merely one application of the provisions of the
Constitution that forbid Congress to allocate power to an ineligible entity, whether
governmental or private.” Dep’t of Transportation v. Ass’n of American Railroads,
135 S. Ct. 1225, 1252 (2015). Similarly, Justice Alito explained: “there is not even a
fig leaf of constitutional justification” when the government delegates regulatory
power to private entities. Id. at 1237.
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nondelegation doctrine that exists as an independent check.332 According to one
commentator, “[i]t is generally acknowledged among the states that delegations
to private parties violate state constitutions. Sometimes this is an absolute bar,
but it may be conditional or expressed in dicta…Only Massachusetts and
Kentucky have dictum to the effect that delegations to private entities may be
valid.”333
Private nondelegation doctrine concerns have overlapped with sports betting
policymaking before. During a Congressional PASPA-related hearing in 1991,
Massachusetts Lottery executive Thomas O’Heir warned the House: “[PASPA]
would delegate to private parties the power to enforce…restrictions against the
states.”334 James Davey from the Oregon State Lottery raised similar concerns
with the House subcommittee: “This legislation…would delegate to private
parties, the professional sports leagues, the power to enforce these restrictions
against the sovereign states.”335
The testimony from O’Heir and Davey was consistent with others. Senator
Chuck Grassley recognized PASPA’s private nondelegation doctrine problems
too: “[PASPA] would prohibit purely intrastate activities. The federal
government has never authorized private parties to enforce such restrictions
against the States. This legislation would do so.”336 Two academic co-authors
agreed: “PASPA is vulnerable to constitutional challenges based on its
procedural mechanisms…PASPA is facially unprecedented law, giving sports
organizations the ability to trump state legislators.”337
Even the five sports leagues who initiated PASPA lawsuits against New
Jersey in 2012 and 2014 warned Congress about the private nondelegation
doctrine.338 In 2007, the NFL, NBA, NHL, NCAA, and MLB opposed draft
legislation that would partially nullify—via an opt-out mechanism—the online
gambling restrictions in the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of
2006.339 The five leagues wrote: “The opt-outs are subject to challenge in U.S.
332

Ryan M. Rodenberg, Due Process, Private Nondelegation Doctrine, and the
Regulation of Sports Betting, 9(1) UNLV GAMING L. J. 99, at 115, n. 94 (2019).
333
Calvin R. Massey, The Non-Delegation Doctrine and Private Parties, 17 GREEN
BAG 2D, 157, 165-166 (2014) (collecting cases).
334
Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act: Hearing on H.R. 74 Before the
Subcomm. on Economic and Commercial Law of the House of Representatives
Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Congress (Sept. 12, 1991).
335
Id.
336
S. Rep. No. 102-248, at 14 (1991).
337
I. Nelson Rose & Rebecca Bolin, Game On for Internet Gambling: With Federal
Approval, State Line Up to Place Their Bets, 45 CONN. L. REV. 653, 687 (2012).
338
OFC Commissioner Baseball, et al. v. Governor Markell, 579 F.3d 293 (3d Cir.
2009) (The same quintet of sports leagues also looked to PASPA when jointly suing
Delaware in 2009).
339
31 U.S.C. § 5361 et seq.
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courts on the grounds that Congress has unconstitutionally delegated its
lawmaking power (to ban Internet gambling) to private parties (commissioners
of various sports leagues and conferences).”340
The prior PASPA-related concerns are equally applicable now in the context
of sports gaming data regulations and the potential off-loading of regulatory
power. Such concerns persist most pointedly at the state level.341 Accordingly, it
is useful to undertake a 50-state survey to gauge the interaction between
nondelgation doctrines and state legislative moves to regulate sports gaming data
via deference to private entities.
Scholars have probed the contours of the private nondelegation doctrine at
the state level. Daniel Schwarcz teased out the “general principles that influence
state court scrutiny of legislative delegations to private actors” and applied his
findings to insurance regulation.342 Schwarcz found states have adopted a threepronged test that involves “(i) the public or private status of the delegate, (ii)
oversight of the delegate by public bodies such as the judiciary or a public
agency, and (iii) the delegate’s independence from the lawmaking function.”343
Schwarcz found the state-level non-delegation doctrine to be “quite robust,”
with “most state constitutions directly limiting legislatures’ powers to delegate
their law-making authority.344 His review of the case law led him to conclude
that “courts universally recognize that legislative delegations of power to private
actors raise more significant constitutional concerns than delegations of power
to government entities.”345 On this point, Schwarcz cited an illustrative Texas
case for the proposition that “courts have universally treated a delegation as
private where ‘interested groups have been given authoritative powers of
determination.’”346 He also found that “courts are often particularly skeptical of
delegations to private entities that hold the prospect of substantially benefitting
those parties’ finances.”347 Schwarcz also pinpointed an important distinction:
One of the most common ways in which state legislatures delegate
authority to private actors is by incorporating privately-produced rules
340

Letter from Rick Buchanan, Exec. VP and Gen. Couns., Nat’l Basketball Ass’n,
et al., to Members of the H. Fin. Serv. Comm. (May 31, 2007).
341
As of June 20, 2020, Congress has not enacted any federal legislation pertaining
to the regulation of sports gaming data.
342
Daniel Schwarcz, Is U.S. Insurance Regulation Unconstitutional? 25 CONN. INS.
L. REV. 191, 218 (2018).
343
Id. at 217.
344
Id. at 218.
345
Id. at 224.
346
Id. at 225 (citing Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952
S.W.2d 454, 474–75 (Tex. 1997)).
347
Id. at 231-232 (citing Carter v. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936); Texas Boll
Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454, 472 (Tex. 1997)).
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or standards into statutes…Statutes that incorporate pre-existing
sources are perfectly innocuous…However, when a statute crossreferences not just existing materials, but also prospectively adopts—
sight unseen—future changes made by private actors to incorporated
materials, the statute transfers to those actors the capacity to change
the law.348
Prior to Schwarcz’s recent analysis, there were two 50-state surveys about
the scope of the nondelegation doctrine.349 Most recently, Jim Rossi found that
“among state courts, there is a diversity of approaches towards interpreting
separation of power provisions for nondelegation purposes.”350 Rossi determined
that states could be divided into one of three mutually exclusive categories—
weak, moderate, and strong.351 In “weak” nondelegation states—such Arkansas,
California, Iowa, Maryland, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin—legislative
delegations are upheld “as long as the agency has adequate procedural safeguards
in place.”352
States in Rossi’s “moderate” category—where “procedural safeguards alone
are rarely enough for a delegation to be valid”—include Alabama, Alaska,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, and
Wyoming.353
Rossi also flagged twenty “strong” nondelegation states where “statutes are
periodically struck down on nondelegation grounds.”354 Such states include:
Arizona, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and West

348

Id. at 222 (citing F. Scott Boyd, Looking Glass Law: Legislation by Reference in
the States, 68 LOUISIANA L. REV. 1201, 1211-12, 1254-55 (2008)).
349
See Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of the Antifederalist
Separation of Powers Ideals in the States, 52(5) VANDERBILT L. REV. 1167 (1999);
see also Gary J. Creco, Standards or Safeguards: A Survey of the Delegation
Doctrine in the States, 8 ADMIN. L. J. AM. U. 567 (1994).
350
Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of the Antifederalist
Separation of Powers Ideals in the States, 52(5) VANDERBILT L. REV. 1167, 1191
(1999). While both Rossi and Creco were seemingly focused on the public
nondelegation doctrine, their findings help inform the contours of the private
nondelegation doctrine too.
351
Id. at 1191-1201.
352
Id. at 1191.
353
Id. at 1198.
354
Id. at 1196-1197.
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Virginia.355
Prior to Rossi’s research, Gary Creco completed a similar survey of the 50
states and found that “state courts have upheld broad delegations of power more
reluctantly” vis-à-vis federal courts.356 Like Rossi, Creco divided the states into
one of three mutually exclusive categories: (i) states with strict standards and
safeguards; (ii) states with loose standards and safeguards; and (iii) procedural
safeguard states.357 States in Creco’s “strict” category require the “legislature to
provide definite standards and/or procedures that the agency must adhere to when
making a decision.”358 Such states include Arizona, Florida, Kentucky,
Massachusetts, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia.359
According to Creco, states with “loose” nondelegation standards and
safeguards—which “allow delegations of lawmaking power to administrative
agencies as long as the statute contains a general rule to guide the agency in
exercising the delegated power”—include Alabama, Alaska, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Minnesota, New Jersey,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Wyoming.360
Creco’s third category—states where delegations are upheld “as long as the
administrative agency has adopted adequate procedural safeguards” included
California, Iowa, Maryland, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin.361
Tennessee, Illinois, and Michigan—the three states with sports betting data
mandates as of June 20, 2020—each have case law that speaks to the ability of
legislatures to delegate authority to private parties or public agencies. Such
precedent increases the chances that a plaintiff may consider a nondelegation
doctrine challenge to the laws in one or more of such states. In Tennessee, West
v. Tennessee Housing Development Agency found that leeway to a public entity
would allow a delegation if it involved a detailed determination of some issue.362
The Tennessee case did not speak to the permissiveness of a delegation of such
a determination to a private entity or a public entity with membership that
included an employee of a self-interested private business, such a professional
355

Id. (For example, the non-delegation doctrine was applied in the context of New
York horse racing); See Fink v. Cole, et al., 302 N.Y. 216, 216 (1951).
356
Gary J. Creco, Standards or Safeguards: A Survey of the Delegation Doctrine in
the States, 8 ADMIN. L. J. AM. U. 567, 578 (1994).
357
Id. at 578-601. Creco excluded Arkansas and Utah “because neither state fits
within any of the three categories.” Id. at 579.
358
Id. at 580.
359
Id. at 586-587.
360
Id. at 588-597.
361
Id. at 598-600.
362
West v. Tennessee Hous. Dev. Agency, 512 S.W.2d 275, 281 (Tenn. 1974).
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sports team.
Like its federal counterpart, Illinois case law suggests that the state follows
some form of the ‘intelligible principle’ test employed in public nondelegation
cases.363 In Hill, the Illinois Supreme Court stated: “Absolute criteria whereby
every detail necessary in enforcement of a law…need not be established by the
General Assembly. The constitution merely requires intelligible standards to be
set to guide the agency charged with enforcement.”364 The resulting Hill test was
followed in later cases,365 although the focus was on delegations to public
agencies, not private actors. In Michigan, the statutory standard handed down by
the legislature must be “as reasonably precise as the subject matter requires or
permits,” with attendant consideration of how complex the regulatory topic is.366
The Michigan Supreme Court also explained that the adequate standards and
safeguards must be in place if administrative agencies exert legislative power.367
IV. POTENTIAL REGULATORY SCRUTINY
MARKET INTERNATIONALLY

OF THE

SPORTS GAMING DATA

There is a decided lack of uniformity in terms of how sports gaming data are
regulated globally. The International Betting Integrity Association—a sports
gaming industry group—“called on all parties engaged in the supply chain of
sports event data that facilitates betting markets, to come together to adhere to a
global best practice[s] model.”368 Researcher Christian Frodl found that “the law
regarding the ownership of sports data is unsettled,” with copyright only
attaching in “certain situations” across a comparative analysis including Europe,
Australia, and the United States.369 Given the limited scope of copyright, Frodl
concluded that sporting event organizers “must rely on other proprietary rights
and supplementary contractual measures to establish their rights over event-

363

Hill v. Relyea, 216 N.E.2d 795, 797 (Ill. 1966). Following Hill v. Relyea, Illinois
courts have also sometimes applied a stricter test that considers, among other things,
the harm to be prevented; See Stofer v. Motor Vehicle Casualty Co, 369 N.E.2d 875,
879 (Ill. 1977); See also Thygesen v. Callahan, 385 N.E.2d 699, 701 (Ill. 1979).
364
Hill, 216 N.E.2d at 797.
365
See Warrior v. Thompson, 449 N.E.2d 53, 57 (Ill. 1983).; see also People v.
Carter, 454 N.E.2d 189, 190-91 (Ill. 1982).
366
People v. Turmon, 340 N.W.2d 620, 623 (Mich. 1983).
367
Id. at 626.
368
Stats Perform to Help Drive Global Best Practice Model for Sports Event Data,
STATSPEFORM (May 21, 2020), https://www.statsperform.com/press/stats-performto-help-drive-global-best-practice-model-for-sports-event-data/.
369
Christian Frodl, Commercialisation of Sports Data: Rights of Event Owners Over
Information and Statistics Generated About Their Sports Events, 26(1) MARQUETTE
SPORTS L. REV. 55, 56 (2015).

Fall 2020]

REGULATING SPORTS GAMING DATA

77

related facts and information.”370 Such uncertainty is at the heart of an on-going
lawsuit—as of June 20, 2020—in Great Britain’s Competition Appeal Tribunal,
which provided the following summary of the initial claim:371

The current litigation involves one data dissemination firm (Sportradar)
making claims against a competitor (Genius Sports/BetGenius) and its sports
league partner (Football DataCo).372 The lawsuit was formally filed after months
370

Id.
Notice of a Claim under Section 47A of the Competition Act 1998, Competition
Appeal Tribunal, Case No. 1342/5/7/20 (March 12, 2020) (on file with author). The
UK court subsequently attached a “confidentiality ring” around the proceedings; see
Consent Order, Competition Appeal Tribunal, Case No. 1342/5/7/20 (June 1, 2020)
(on file with author). For an example of another on-going dispute, see Ukraine FA
Blasts Sportradar Over Unauthorised Data, IGAMINGBUSINESS (June 19, 2020); see
also Brad Allen, Sportradar Accused of ‘Unauthorized’ Data Distribution by
Ukrainian Soccer League, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (June 23, 2020), https://www.legal
sportsreport.com/42132/sportradar-ukraine-soccer-data/.
372
According to Sportradar’s official statement announcing the lawsuit:
This legal action is embarked upon with reluctance and Sportradar has not
taken the decision lightly. Sportradar had hoped to find a fair solution that
enables it to build its own database and to compete effectively in the market,
but that has not proved possible. Sportradar remains open to the possibility
of finding a resolution. However, ultimately, Sportradar supports a
competitive marketplace in which there is genuine choice between
suppliers. This competition is vital for innovation, genuine product choice
and fair pricing and we believe these elements are worth protecting. The
step Sportradar has taken is focused on that outcome. Sportradar is, and has
always been, willing to pay for access, and to be part of an integrated,
371
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of media coverage foreshadowing the dispute. One media outlet reported that
Sportradar sent a letter accusing Genius Sports/BetGenius “of holding ‘an
unlawful information monopoly over publicly available sports data.’”373 The
lawsuit, which is still in its early stages, could have relevance beyond the British
market:
The tussle centres around the legitimacy of Genius’s arrangement with
[Football DataCo]. Genius accuses Sportradar of mining data from
Premier League stadiums in violation of ticketing conditions, which
state that data collected in a stadium cannot be used for commercial
purposes. Sportradar argues that Genius’s deal with [Football DataCo]
has created a monopoly that is contrary to EU competition law and
therefore those ticketing conditions are void. The issue has become
increasingly heated after Sportradar signed an exclusive deal with the
NFL in the US [in 2019]. Sportradar said this was not a monopoly
accredited, and fair system of collection and distribution which enables
competition. Sportradar believes that the system put in place by Betgenius
and FDC does not allow for this outcome; and that the current arrangements
are in breach of UK and EU Competition Law. This status is not only
harmful to data supply companies like Sportradar, but also to the
downstream market (bookmakers and their customers) where product
choice is being restricted or removed in favour of an information monopoly.
This is why Sportradar has now sought adjudication by an independent
specialist tribunal in the hope that matters can be resolved fairly and
equitably. Sportradar’s Statement on Legal Proceedings Against Betgenius
and FDC, SPORTRADAR (March 4, 2020), https://www.sportradar.com/
news-archive/sportradars-statement-on-legal-proceedings-againstbetgenius-and-fdc/.
373
Alice Hancock, Sports Data Groups Battle Over Lucrative Rights, FINANCIAL
TIMES (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/395d3de4-e08a-11e9-9743db5a370481bc. For further background, see Owain Flanders, Genius Sports Still
Open to Sublicensing UK Football Rights,
but Not with Sportradar, as It Stands, GAMBLING INSIDER (Sept. 3, 2019),
https://www.gamblinginsider.com/news/7791/genius-sports-still-open-tosublicensing-uk-football-rights-but-not-with-sportradar-as-it-stands. (“Sportradar
says it is willing to make a sublicensing deal with Genius for a fair access fee, but
Genius is declining to engage in any discussions to increase its own market share.”);
Sabah Meddings, Data Firms Sportradar and Genius Sports in Legal Row over
Football Bets; Battle Kicks Off over Rights to Provide Live Information for Online
Gambling, THE TIMES (Aug. 31, 2019), https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/datafirms-sportradar-and-genius-sports-in-legal-row-over-football-bets-mdhh2m55l;
Scott Longley, Football’s Brand New Heavies, IGAMING BUSINESS (Aug. 28, 2019),
https://www.igamingbusiness.com/analysis/football-s-brand-new-heavies;
Ben
Cronin, Sportradar and Genius Dispute Will Influence Future Data Deals,
SPORTBUSINESS (Oct. 7, 2019), https://www.sportbusiness.com/2019/10/sportradarand-genius-dispute-will-influence-future-data-deals.
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because all NFL games were televised and therefore anyone could put
together a data feed from the live stream. Not all UK football matches
are. But the stakes are high. The US is projected to become one of the
most cash-generative betting markets in the world with William Hill,
the UK bookmaker, projecting that it could add up to $19bn by 2023.
US sports lend themselves particularly well to in-play betting — or
prop bets as they are known there.374
The initiation of the lawsuit was foreshadowed a year earlier when
Sportradar raised competition concerns generally in the context of a
commissioned report about gambling in tennis that included considerable
attention to how news and information about tennis competition was utilized:
Restraint of trade is a common law doctrine relating to the
enforceability of contractual restrictions on freedom to conduct
business. The risk of foreclosing a market, and the potential for
competition law infringement, including the risks for the relevant
International [Tennis] Governing Bodies, does not appear to have been
considered in relation to Recommendation 1. For example, on the face
of it, prohibition rules could amount to a restrictive agreement under
Article 101/Chapter I. Indeed, para 212 of the Interim Report could be
viewed as facilitating indirect collusion between relevant International
[Tennis] Governing Bodies to ensure that specific obligations are
universally applied to the downstream markets. In addition, a relevant
International [Tennis] Governing Body will no doubt be concerned
that if they are deemed to be dominant in the market for the provision
of particular live scoring data, then the withdrawal of such supply to
the various, already well established, downstream markets would leave
it open to accusations of abusing a dominant position. Indeed, the
specific recommendation that “International [Tennis] Governing
Bodies to include in their contracts for the sale of official data to each
data supply company… a requirement that the data supply company
impose specified obligations that betting operators must fulfil and
continue to fulfil, in each case as a precondition of the continued

374

Alice Hancock, Sports Data Groups Battle Over Lucrative Rights, FINANCIAL
TIMES (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/395d3de4-e08a-11e9-9743db5a370481bc; For further discussion of the impact the litigation could have
globally, see Brad Allen, Sportradar Launches Legal
Action Against Betgenius in UK Soccer Row, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (March 4, 2020),
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/38690/sportradar-sues-betgenius-soccer-data;
Matt Rybaltowski, Implications of Landmark Sportradar
Lawsuit Unclear on US Sports Betting Market, SPORTS HANDLE (March 4, 2020),
https://sportshandle.com/sportradar-2020-landmark-suit/.
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supply of official data” will be of concern because of the potential
tying obligations imposed in at least two related markets.375
Other portions of Sportradar’s response to the tennis gambling report also
flagged issues relevant to the regulation of sports gaming data globally.
According to Sportradar:

375

(i)

Unofficial data is referred to in the [tennis gambling report] as
if it is a ‘black market’ product. This is wrong, it is a
legitimate product. There are no ‘rights’ attached to the tennis
match data, which is publicly available information. Even the
enforcement of a property right to try to restrict the collection
of this data, that is such a significant and essential input for
the betting market, is legally questionable, as well as being a
resource intensive undertaking across such a large
international tournament network.376

(ii)

Sportradar collects the data from audio-visual feeds and
conducts its own manual data collection to create a database in
order to offer a competitive product to the market. It is
understood that some rights holders are not comfortable with
such arrangements but (as stated above) it should also be
made clear a) that there is no legal basis for asserting a socalled “data right”; and b) that Sportradar is no different from
its competitors in this regard. There is no major sports data
company in the world that does not offer a mix of official and
unofficial data to its customers. And whereas Sportradar has
official data licences with organisations such as the NBA,
NHL, PDC, ITF and Tennis Australia for each of these sports,
Sportradar’s competitors are providing alternative sources of
supply – just as Sportradar does for certain other competitions
including in other parts of tennis. That is the market reality.377

(iii)

The nature of the obligations that the [tennis gambling report
panel] has recommended in respect of the proposed conditions

Sportradar Response to the Independent Review of Integrity in Tennis,
SPORTRADAR at 103 (Aug. 2018) (on file with author).
376
Id. at 41, 43 (citing Andrew Nixon, Data
Collection from Sports Events: A Nonexclusive Future? LAWINSPORT (Aug. 9,
2018), https://www.lawinsport.com/topics/item/data-collection-from-sports-eventsa-nonexclusive-future (discussing “[t]he danger of information monopolies”)).
377
Id. at 45, 47.
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of official supply (both for data supply companies and for
betting operators) is unfeasible and unrealistic. These
requirements (whereby these parties must agree not to offer
any unofficial tennis product or service as a pre-condition of
receiving certain official content) disregards the reality of the
data market and the legal position on intellectual property
rights. Under the proposed mechanism, to take a theoretical
example, the official data partner for Roland Garros, could not
offer data on the other Grand Slam events, let alone the other
Tours, even to the extent that they are televised and available,
unless they were also the official data partner for those events.
Similarly, a betting operator who took the same Roland
Garros feed would have to commit that it would not offer any
other markets (not even pre-match) on other events, even if
they were fully streamed or televised, unless it had acquired
the official rights (even though those rights are not legally
necessary). This fundamentally misunderstands the data
market, the legitimacy of unofficial data and the dynamics of
data supply.378

378
379

(iv)

Provided that the “unofficial data” is independently collected
and compiled (and is not extracted and/or reutilized from, say,
the ITF's or the ATP's database without consent), it will not
infringe any right. Therefore, while the Panel recommends
and “hopes” that data supply companies or betting operators
do not seek to establish markets based on “unofficial data”
this overlooks the fact that prima facie there is no legal barrier
to prevent “unofficial data” being collected directly from
streams or even venues (please see below for our comments
on the enforceability of ticketing terms and conditions and our
other comments in respect of potential competition law
issues).379

(v)

While it is well established that data generated during the
course of competitions is an important part of a rights holder’s
commercial portfolio, it cannot be said that the rights holder
‘owns’ the data deriving from those competitions. There is
currently no established intellectual property in sports data
and there is no such thing as a “data right” per se. The data is
simply publicly available information. From an EU
perspective, this principle was explained by Floyd J, back in
2012, in Football DataCo v Sportradar and others [2012]

Id. at 95-96.
Id. at 101.
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EWHC 185: “...if one allows a database right to attach to data
which is created by the maker of the database the creator
obtains a true monopoly in that data. Such a result would be
inconsistent with the objectives of the [EU Database]
Directive. The Directive should not be construed in a way
which gives a party a monopoly in facts….where a database
consists of data obtained from sources available to the public,
such as existing published data, the balance of policy
considerations is different. There is (or should be) nothing to
prevent the public from investing in obtaining those data from
themselves…”380
A. Europe
Copyright provides little protection for news and information relevant to
sports betting in Europe.381 Indeed, a commentator concluded that “[b]ased on
national legislation in Europe, pure statistical facts of sporting events do not
subsist any copyright work and are therefore not copyrightable.”382 With
copyright claims largely foreclosed, the bulk of litigation in Europe has centered
around potential findings of intellectual property rights attached to sports-related
data and the controlling weight of the European Union’s (“EU”) ‘Database
Directive’ codified in Articles 4(1), 7 of the Database Directive 96/9/EC of the
EU.383 The EU’s Database Directive “provides so-called sui generis database
rights to the person who has made substantial investments in the collection of
data in the database.”384 The “sui generis protection for the ‘substantial
380

Id. at 101-102 (italics removed).
See Joined Cases C-403/08 & 429/08, Football Ass’n Premier League Ltd v. QC
Leisure, 2011 E.C.R. I-09083, ¶ 98 (“sporting events cannot be regarded as
intellectual creations classifiable as works within the meaning of the Copyright
Directive…[this] applies in particular to football matches, which are subject to rules
of the game, leaving no room for creative freedom for the purposes of copyright”).
382
Bjorn Hessert, The Processing of Personal Real-Time Sports Performance
Information of Athletes: A European Perspective, (Working Paper 2019) (on file with
author).
383
Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March
1996 on the Legal Protection of Databases, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20.
384
Hessert, supra note 382, at 5.
Evidence is scant about the quantity of database enforcement claims in the EU. In
2018, one company publicly disclosed the apparent resolution of a database-related
claim. See Settlement of Database Right Infringement Proceedings Brought by
Sportradar Against Betconstruct and Others,
SPORTRADAR (July 2, 2018) (on file with author), https://www.sportradar.com/newsarchive/settlement-of-database-right-infringement-proceedings-brought-bysportradar-against-betconstruct-and-others/.
381
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investment’ that information compilers expend” is unique to the EU, as it is not
found elsewhere.385
Such sui generis property rights—granted via the equivalent of a statute—
are unique to the EU and carry important implications in the regulation of sports
gaming data.386 A number of legal proceedings, including lawsuits involving
sports leagues and third party brokers of news and information relevant to sports
betting, have arose, helping to define whether database protection can be
extended to sports gaming data commercial arrangements that purport to be
‘exclusive’ in nature.387
The Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) has decided a series
of cases in the past twenty years setting the parameters of how sports gaming
data can be utilized, including whether any type of sui generis database right
attaches. Multiple lawsuits resulted from a dispute about Premier League fixture
lists and overseas betting operators use thereof.388 In each case,389 CJEU did not
find any unauthorized use of such fixture lists, rationalizing that “the Premier
League had not allocated separate resources or made specific investments for
drawing up the fixtures.”390
More recent on-point litigation includes Football DataCo v. Yahoo! UK Ltd

385

Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright, Common Law, and Sui Generis Protection of
Databases in the United States and Abroad, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 151 (1997).
386
See Scott Longley, ‘Settled State’ Part 1: The Sports Data Debate in Europe,
BETTINGUSA (Jan. 27, 2020), https://www.bettingusa.com/europe-sports-data/; see
also Harrison Sayers, US Data Laws
Could Spread to Europe, Warns Provider, GAMBLING COMPLIANCE (June 19, 2019),
https://gamblingcompliance.com/premium-content/insights_analysis/us-data-lawscould-spread-europe-warns-provider. For a detailed overview, see Study on Sports
Organisers’ Rights in the European Union, ASSER INSTITUTE. (Feb. 2014),
https://www.asser.nl/media/2624/final-report_sor-2014.pdf (on file with author).
387
For a summary of a high-profile incident involving sports gaming data, see ChrisStevens-Smith, Whose Data Is It Anyway? Part 1—Hull City Fan Caught Up In the
Tangled-Web of Football Data, SQUIRE PATTON BOGGS (Sept. 19, 2019),
https://www.sports.legal/2019/09/. See also Chris-Stevens-Smith, Whose Data Is It
Anyway? Part 2—Does Anyone Actually Own Football Data? SQUIRE PATTON
BOGGS (Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.sports.legal/2019/09/.
388
Case C-338/02, Fixtures Marketing Ltd v. Svenska Spel AB, 2004 ECR 1.10497;
Case C-46/02, Fixtures Marketing Ltd v. Oy Veikkaus Ab, 2004 ECR 1-10365; Case
C-444/02, Fixtures Marketing Ltd v. Organismos prognostikon agonon podosfairou
AE, 2004 ECR 1-10549.
389
Id.
390
Frodl, supra note 369, at, 78. The CJEU reached a similar conclusion in the
context of horse racing. See Case C-203/02, British Horseracing Board Ltd v.
William Hill Organization Ltd, 2004 ER 1-10415.
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391

and Football DataCo v. Sportradar GmbH.392 Both cases involved Football
DataCo, a company tethered to the Premier League. In the Yahoo! case, the CJEU
determined that “databases may qualify for copyright protection if they, by the
selection or arrangement of their content, constitute an original expression of the
creative freedom of its author.”393 In the Sportradar case, the CJEU found that
data broker Sportradar “violated Football DataCo’s sui generis database right by
publishing online the results and information of these soccer leagues.”394
Attorney Andrew Nixon set out a potential future model:
There can be no monopoly in facts, and to seek to create such a
monopoly engages Competition Law. It would likely be acceptable for
the event organiser to charge a fair and reasonable fee for access rights
to data collectors: they are, after all, the “landowner.” What the event
organiser cannot legitimately do is licence access rights to one
undertaking, to the absolute exclusion of all others. The irony is that a
non-exclusive model, as well as having better prospects of being
compatible with EU competition law, is likely to be more lucrative, in
the longer term, to an event organiser, or rights owner, than seeking to
squeeze maximum rent from one exclusive partner. It is also likely to
have a positive impact on an event organiser’s ability to protect its
event from an integrity perspective:
Firstly, irrespective of any exclusive arrangement, data companies are
likely to continue to send data collectors to venues to collect the data,
whether it is labelled “unofficial” or not because that data is an
essential input to their businesses, and without it they cannot service
their customers. As such, the event organiser is better off monetising
this demand in the downstream market more widely rather than trying
to enforce exclusivity around access rights when such enforcement
would be patently anti-competitive and open to challenge.
Secondly, the reality is that a competitive market place benefits
everyone, including the event organiser and there are inherent dangers
in the market being reliant on a single data feed. For example, from a
betting perspective, numerous bookmakers may wish to use more than
one data feed, whether as a backup or a cross check. A number of the
data collection companies which would ordinarily be excluded invest
in rigorous reporting standards, quality control systems as well as
checks on fraud and match manipulation. By restricting access to a

391

Case C-604/10, 2012 ECR 115, ¶ 27.
Case C-173/11, 2012 ECR 642.
393
Frodl, supra note 369, at 79 (citing 2012 ECR 115, 27 at 28-32).
394
Id. at 80 (citing 2012 ECR 642).
392
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single, exclusive undertaking the additional value created by a
competitive market would be lost along with the innovation that
accompanies such healthy competition.
Furthermore, having more than one source can also guard against the
practice of courtsiding. It is logical that multiple providers, attending
sports venues, and competing with one another on speed will mean that
these risks are at worst more easily identified, managed and reduced,
but at best they will be marginalised and eradicated. The same point
applies to so called “ghost matches:” this is less of an issue in
sophisticated sporting markets such as the UK, but it is nevertheless a
genuine risk attached to single source data feeds, particularly in respect
of non-televised matches, and less prominent sports or events, where
the bookmakers’ ability to verify particular results is restricted. It is
also fair to state that a competitive data collection market would help
limit the extent to which database rights infringement occurs.
“Scraped” data is, by its very nature, less reliable than data acquired
directly from sources at the venue (such as data collected by in venue
collectors). These “grey markets” are more likely to emerge when
there is a single source because monopoly pricing could create
incentives for bookmakers to sacrifice reliability in return for cost
savings. A competitive, multi-operator market would mean that a grey
market is less likely to emerge; and lead to overall consumer welfare
gains, as well as a tangible and long-term benefit to the rights
holder.395
Beyond country-specific laws pertaining to copyright and intellectual
property rights, an additional consideration in the EU is the General Data
Protection Regulation (“GDPR”),396 which is focused on a more personal level.
The GDPR defines ‘real-time sports performance information’ as “any
information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person in connection
with her or his sporting activity, including numbers, tracking, and video
recording.”397 According to a commentator, the GDPR may provide a buffer of
sorts—via a consent requirement—against centralized sports gaming data
commercialization, with athletes in the EU perhaps “hav[ing] a right of
compensation under…GDPR if the usage of personal real-time sports
395

Andrew Nixon, Data Collection from Sports Events: A Nonexclusive Future?,
LAWINSPORT (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.lawinsport.com/topics/item/datacollection-from-sports-events-a-nonexclusive-future.
396
Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of April 26,
2016 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data
and on the free movement of such data and repealing Directive 95/46/EC 2016 O.J.
(L 119/1).
397
Id. at Art. 4.
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performance information constitutes a violation of [the GDPR].”398
1. Great Britain
Two cases that resulted in CJEU rulings—Football DataCo v. Yahoo! UK
Ltd and Football DataCo v. Sportradar GmbH—also resulted in legal decisions
being issued by British courts. In the Yahoo! case, “the High Court of Justice
‘issu[ed] a sealed Order declaring that fixture lists are not protected by database
copyright or database rights in the [United Kingdom’”].399 In contrast, the
Sportradar case “first recognized the protection of sports databases under article
7 of the Database Directive [and] found that the live collection of the results and
further data relating to the professional leagues in the United Kingdom and the
processing in Football DataCo’s databases constituted a substantial investment
by Football DataCo, which met the standards under European law for sui generis
protection.”400 Researcher Frodl described the importance of the ruling in Great
Britain and beyond:
The court precisely differentiated between sports data that is tied to the
organization of the sporting competition, such as fixture lists, and
sports data that is generated separately by observing the game.
Following this decision, sports bodies and sport event owners may
successfully establish an infringement of their sui generis database
right under United Kingdom copyright law, provided they can prove
that the sports data contained in their databases is extracted and
reutilized without their consent. Because the decision is based on an
application of article 7 of the Database Directive, its rationale can be
extrapolated to other European Union member states. If this approach
is litigated, however, sports database owners must prove that the
particular data is de facto gathered from their databases—not collected
independently by a third-party (e.g., by observing the broadcast of an
event). In this context, the above-mentioned supplementary protection
measures, such as restrictions on data collection inside a venue, may
become pertinent. If implemented, the restrictions may enable event
owners to successfully establish that the utilized data may only
originate from their database or the data was gathered in breach of a
contractual obligation.
2. France

398

Hessert, supra note 382, at 8. (“The collection of personal real-time sports
performance information falls within the substantive scope…of the GDPR.”).
399
Frodl, supra note 369, at 81.
400
Id. at 82.
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Two aspects of French law are distinguishable from others in the EU in terms
of how sports gaming data are regulated. First, the law provides “sports event
owners and sports federations exclusive database exploitation rights.”401 Second,
the law mandates that “any sports data usage by betting companies requires the
consent of mentioned sports-related rights holders.”402 In other words, sports
leagues effectively have veto rights over sports gaming offerings and usage of
news/information therein.
3. Other
An sampling of the legal and regulatory status of sports gaming data in other
countries revealed wide variation. In Germany, researcher Frodl wrote that
“owners of sports databases under German law may claim a sui generis right
under Article 7 of the Database Directive, provided that the database owners can
overcome [the] procedural hurdle of proving an illegal extraction and
reutilization of the database content.”403 Hungary and Poland—like France—
enacted a statute bestowing “a right in favour of event owners to consent to
betting on sports events.”404 New Zealand law similarly mandates that sports bets
not be offered “without the written agreement of the appropriate New Zealand
national sporting organisation.”405
B. Australia
Researcher Christian Frodl described the “legal protection of sports data in
Australia [a]s heterogeneous.”406 When news and information are used for
betting purposes, “the commercial interests of event organizers are protected by
state laws, which allow event owners to negotiate a contractual agreement with
betting and wagering operators as a condition to using…event-related
information for betting purposes.”407 In other words, the Australian “regulatory
regimes require betting and wagering operators to receive approval of, or enter
into an agreement with, sports governing bodies for the use of…information
relating to their sports events.”408 Such mandates are most prominent in Victoria,
Australia, where “a sports event must be approved by the Victorian Commission
401

Hessert, supra note 382, at 6 (citing Article L. 333-1 of the French Code du
sport).
402
Id.
403
Frodl, supra note 369, at 85.
404
Id. at 85 n.170.
405
Racing Act 2003, s 55 (N.Z.).
406
Frodl, supra note 369, at 66.
407
Id.
408
Id. (citing, among others, Gambling Regulation Act 2003 (Victoria) ss 2.5 19,
4.5.1 (Australia)).
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for Gambling and Liquor Regulations as a condition to offer bets on such
events.”409
Statutory law in Australia was enacted under the shadow of a historical court
ruling dismissive of the notion that news and information about a sporting event
could be owned and/or controlled. In Victoria Park Racing & Recreation
Grounds Co. v. Taylor,410 a dispute about the broadcasting of a sporting event,
the court found that it “has not been referred to any authority in English law
which supports the general contention that if a person chooses to organize an
entertainment or do anything else which other persons are able to see he has a
right to obtain from a court an order that they shall not describe to anybody what
they see.”411 Further, the court found that “a person who creates an event or
spectacle does not thereby entitle himself to the exclusive right of first publishing
the ‘news’ or photograph of the event or spectacle.”412 Likewise, a “‘spectacle’
cannot be ‘owned’ in any ordinary sense of that word.”413 Nevertheless, the court
did suggest that ticketing for admittance to the event could be employed to inhibit
access.414
In July 2012, a consulting firm completed a study entitled ‘Optimal Product
Fee Models for Australian Sporting Bodies’ and addressed sports gaming
regulatory issues.415 The report found that “sports wagering is a clear ‘two sided’
market, where it is in the interests of both the Australian licensed wagering
operators and the sporting codes to maintain a competitive, innovative wagering
product that will maximize returns to both sides.”416 Among other things, the
report focused on the symbiotic relationship between sports viewing and sports
gaming: “Sporting codes will increasingly benefit from wagering as it increases
viewing of sports and potentially the rates they can charge sponsors of their
events…[w]agering operators in turn benefit from increased sports viewing
because of its impact on demand for wagering related to the event.”417 The report
also focused on integrity concerns, finding that weakness in either sports betting
or the sporting codes can have significant negative implications for both sides of
the market.”418

409

Id.
Victoria Park Racing & Recreation Grounds Co. v. Taylor, 58 CLR 479 (1937).
411
Id. at 496.
412
Id. at 518.
413
Id. at 496.
414
Id. at 494.
415
DELOITTE, OPTIMAL PRODUCT FEE MODELS FOR AUSTRALIAN SPORTING BODIES
(2012) (on file with author).
416
Id. at 6.
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Id. at 18.
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Id. at 19.
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V. CONCLUSION
Regulating sports gaming data is as complex as it is timely.419 While the
regulation of sports gaming data has primarily been in focus of late within the
419

Given the dynamic nature of the global pandemic as of August 7, 2020, this paper
does not endeavor to provide any soothsayer-type of insight into how the regulation
of sports gaming data will be impacted vis-à-vis the worldwide public health issues
that have affected the sports gaming industry in ways unimaginable at the start of
2020. With that said, five noteworthy developments have emerged. First, somewhat
obscure sporting events have become popular with bettors. See Paula Lavigne, et al.,
Gambling on Table Tennis is Blowing Up—But Are the Matches Legit?, ESPN (May
25, 2020), https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/29206521/gambling-table-tennisblowing-the-matches-legit. See also Borja Garcia-Garcia, et al., The Impact of Covid19 on Sports: A Mid-Way Assessment, INT’L SPORTS L. J. (forthcoming 2020).
Second, companies in the business of selling news and information relevant for
sports gaming have prominently moved to fund and/or organize sporting events with
an eye towards creating sports gaming content that can be wagered upon. See David
Purdum, Betting Companies Help Get Tennis Players Back on the Court, ESPN
(June 17, 2020), https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/29315110/bettingcompanies-help-get-tennis-players-back-court. See also Luke Massey, Net Gains:
How Sportradar is Helping to Bring Back Tennis, SBCNEWS (May 21, 2020),
https://sbcnews.co.uk/features/2020/05/21/net-gains-sportradar-helping-bringtennis-back/. Third, with multiple U.S.-based sports leagues planning to resume
games without spectators on-site, there will be a quasi-natural experiment to: (i)
evaluate data dissemination strategies in the absence of courtsiders and (ii) test the
scope of the safe harbor under the Wire Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 1084(b) (2018). See
also United States v. Scavo, 593 F.2d 837, 841 (8th Cir. 1979) (“we reject appellant’s
blanket assertion that suppliers of line information are outside the scope of §
1084(b)”); United States v. Ross, 1999 WL 782749, *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 1999)
(“transmissions reporting the results of sporting events, the odds placed on particular
contests by odds-makers, or the identities of persons seeking to place bets would be
examples of ‘information’ [under § 1084(b)]”); Jared Diamond, Baseball Stadiums
are Closed to Fans, but this Guy’s Balcony is Open for Business, WALL ST. J. (June
30, 2020, 9:08 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/baseball-stadiums-major-leaguebaseball-padres-nationals-petco-stadium-11593522380. Fourth, certain states—such
as Michigan—have moved to promulgate draft regulations aimed at restricting longrunning methods of information dissemination such as web scraping and live
scouting. See Tony Batt, Battle Over U.S. Sports Betting Data
Collection May Be Destined for Court, GAMBLING COMPLIANCE (Aug. 5, 2020),
https://gamblingcompliance.com/premium-content/insights_analysis/battle-over-ussports-betting-data-collection-may-be-destined. Fifth, some entities involved in the
market for sports gaming news and information have moved to inquire about the
prospects of certain best practices in the industry. See Scott Longley,
The Best Practice Challenge for Sports Data, IGAMINGBUSINESS (July 13, 2020),
https://www.igamingbusiness.com/analysis/best-practice-challenge-sports-data.
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context of the nascent U.S. market, the issue is global and impacts the entire
commercialized sports ecosystem. Indeed, the sheer number of industry-relevant
players makes it difficult to capture all the varied—and sometimes competing—
interests at play. For example, private sector stakeholders with a tethered interest
in the regulation of sports gaming data include sports gaming consumers, sports
gaming operators, sports leagues, athletes and their labor unions, advertisers,
broadcasters, data dissemination firms, sports fans, and journalists. In the public
realm, lawmakers, judges, and executive branch government officials are
increasingly dealing with sports gaming data issues too. This paper provides a
roadmap—or a Whack-A-Mole type of preview—for all the complex potential
legal issues that will likely arise in the regulation of sports gaming data moving
forward.

